University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1997

Conflicts and Defense Lawyers: From Triangles to Tetrahedrons
Tom Baker
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Economics Commons, Insurance Commons,
Insurance Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Torts Commons

Repository Citation
Baker, Tom, "Conflicts and Defense Lawyers: From Triangles to Tetrahedrons" (1997). Faculty Scholarship
at Penn Law. 870.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/870

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

LIABILITY INSURANCE CONFLICTS AND
DEFENSE LAWYERS: FROM TRIANGLES TO
TETRAHEDRONS
Tom Baker*
TABLE OF C ONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.

.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

102

I. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING INSURANCE DEFENSE CONFLICTS:
SHARED CLAIM RISK AND THE LIABILITY INSURANCE
...

TETRAHEDRON .
.

.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. SHARED CLAIMRISK

.

.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. THELIABILITYINSURANCE TETRAHEDRON

. . .106

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · · · · · · · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .

. .

.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .
. . .

. . . . . .

107
109

II. EXPLORING THE LIABILITY INSURANCE TETRAHEDRON THROUGH
PATTERN CONFLICT CASES

.

. . . .

1. The Low Limits Case .. ... . ....
2. The Mul tiple Victim Case . . .
. .

.

.

.

.

. . . .

. . .

. . .

. ... .. . . .
.
. .

. . .

... . . . .
.

.

. .

.

.

. . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . .

..

..

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

.

. . . .

.

.

.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 114
. .

. . .

114

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

118

. . . .

. . .

. . . . .

.

. . . . . . . . . .

.113

.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. SHAREDCLAIMRISK RESULTING FROMDOLLARLIMITS

.

. . . . . . . .

.

. . . . . .

.

B. SHARED CLAIMRISK RESULTING FROMINSURANCE COVERAGE
UNCERTAINTY ...........................................................................................121

. . . .
1. The Misrepresentation Case . .. . . . ... . .
2. The Separation Assaul t. .. .. ..
.. .
.. .. .
..
. . .

3. The

Softball Case

. . . .

. . . . . . .

. .
.

.

. . . . . . . .

. .

. .

. . .

.

. . . . . . . .

. .. . .
. .

.

. . . .

.

.

. .

.

. .

. . . . .

. .

. . . . . .

.

.

.

.

. . . . . .

.. . .. .. .. . .
. .

. .

C. SHARED CLAIM RISK FROM UNCOVERED HARM

. . .

. .

. .

.

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

.

.

. . .

.

. . . . .

.

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

.

... 121
.

.

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

.

. . . .

125

. 127
.129

1. The Food Poisoning Case .......................................................................129
2. The Punitive Damages Case ....................................................................132
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

III. THE DUTY TO DEFEND WHOM AGAINST WHAT?

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

134

A. A JUDGMENT RISK APPROACH TO THE DUTY TO DEFEND ............................135
B. DEFENSE LAWYERS AND SETTLEMENT R I SK ................................................139
C. CONFLICTS IN THE JUDGEMENT RISK APPROACH .........................................143
D. LEAVENING THE JUDGEMENT RISK APPROACH ............................................146
CONCLUSION

. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

149

* Copyright 1 997 Tom Baker, Connecticut Mutual Professor and Director, I nsurance
Law Center, University of Connecticut School of Law. This article was written at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem during a research leave provided by the University of
M i ami School of Law. Thank you to both institutions for their support and to James
Fischer, Robert Jerry and Stephen Pepper for comments on an earlier draft.

[Vol. 4: I

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

1 02

I NTRODUCTION

One problem zn thinking through the lawyer's
responsibilities in triangular relationships is that the
relationship may not be continuously triangular. . . .
Conceptualizing both the 'relevant others' as clients, and
the lawyer as engaged in multiple representation, seems
entirely natural when the triangular relationship is in its
normal state. The question is whether there are reasons for
refusing to conceptualize it in this way.
-Geoffrey Hazari
The

conflicts of interest that

can arise when liability insurance

companies control the defense and settlement of claims filed against their
2
insureds have long concerned members of the tort defense bar, as well as
3
4
speciali sts in the fields of insurance and professional responsibility. I
approach these conflicts from an insurance perspective, and I begin with
the

following

observation:

Whatever

else

can

be

said

about

the

relationship between a defense lawyer, an insurance company and an
insured, that relationship exists only because the company issued the
in sured a liability insurance policy.

Most liability insuranc e policies

assign the company the "duty" and "right" to defend the insured whenever
the insured requests a defense against a defined set of c laims. Ordinarily,
the company fulfills that duty and exerci ses that right by retaining a lawyer
to defend the insured.

In that situation, the scope of the lawyer ' s

representation o f the insured will include all that i s encompassed within

the company's duty to defend.

This articl e explores the scope of the defense lawyer ' s representation

of the insured by thinking about the lawyer as the means for fulfillin g the
company ' s duty to. defend.

A basic-and I think new-insight is that the

conflicts of interest that draw our attention to the insurance defense lawyer
arise out of an incomplete transfer from insured to company of what I will
call "claim risk." I focus on the incomplete transfer of claim risk because
1.

Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: A n Exploratory Analysis,
I GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 1 5, 3 5- 3 8 ( 1 987).
2 . See, ·e.g., Brooke Wunnicke, The Eternal Triangle: Standards of Ethical
Representation By the insurance Defense Lawyer, FOR THE D EF., Feb. 1989, at 7.
3. See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Se!llement,
67 HARV. L. REV. 1 1 36 ( 1 954).
4. See, e.g. , CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN L EGA L ETHICS 3 8, 42 ( 1 986).

I
I

l
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When the company bears all the

important claim risk, we hardly need to think about the company ' s duty to
defend, because the company has every incentive to attend to the defense.
In that situation, the interesting issues concern the company ' s

right

defend and what the insured must do to cooperate in that defense .

to

It is

only when the company ' s incentive begins to wane that the duty to defend
becomes interesting.

A second basic insight concerns the importance of looking beyond the

familiar triangle of the lawyer, the insured and the company when
analyzing liability insurance conflicts .

The triangle is a useful metaphor,

but it leaves out a crucial participant: the plaintiff who brings the liability
claim.

A relationship between a defense lawyer, an insurance company

and an insured exists only in relation to-that is, in a relationship with--a

plaintiff.

For that reason, we cannot understand the dynamics of the

professional responsibility triangle without also considering the plaintiff.
Accordingly, when thinking about insurance defense lawyers I prefer
to picture the liability insurance relationship, not as a simple triangle, but
rather as the set of triangles that exists between four points-a tetrahedron.
When looking at any particular face of a tetrahedron, it can appear to be a
simple triangle, j ust as when looking at any one aspect of the liability
insurance relationship, it can appear to involve only three partie s .

But,

there is always the "hidden" fourth party, whose relationship with these
three parties will affect their relationships with each other.
Figure

1

on the following the following page depicts one view of the

liability insurance tetrahedron.

As figure

1

reflects, the professional

responsibility triangle is not the only interesting face of the tetrahedron .

There is also the jury triangle, composed of the three parties that a j ury
deciding the liability claim would see: the lawyer, the insured, and the

plaintiff.

There is the settlement triangle, composed of the three parties

who, ordinarily, negotiate toward settlement of the claim: the lawyer, the
company, and the plaintiff. 5 And there is a final, very interesting triangle
composed of the plaintiff, the insured and the company that I will have a
great deal to say about.

Each of these faces of the liability insurance

tetrahedron can seem to form a three way relationship .

As with the

5. See Charles Silver & Kent D. Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 293-96 ( 1 996) (on "ordinary" case).
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professional

responsibility

triangle,

our

understanding
6
relationships can be deepened by considering the fourth party.

of

these
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FIGURE 1

Part I of this article introduces this tetrahedron framework. Part II then
explores the framework in the context of three sets of hypothetical cases
involving the incomplete transfer of claim risk: one set in which the risk is

shared because of dollar limits on the insurance coverage; a second set in
which the risk is shared because of uncertainty about insurance coverage
for the case; and a third set in which the risk is shared because the plaintiff
has the potential to cause the insured a kind of harm that is not covered by

\

l

I

l

6. In al l of this I readily acknowledge that I have collapsed the plaintiff and the
plaintiff s lawyer into a single unit, even though these two parties do not always have
identical interests. I t i s my working hypothesis that, at least as respects the professional
responsibilities of insurance defense lawyers, nothing of analytical importance is l ost as a
result.

1 997]
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My goal is to use the tetrahedron framework to

explore the conflicts in these cases and also to use these cases to explore
whether that framework is a useful analytical tool.
Part III then addresses the role o f the defense l awyer in fulfilling the
company' s duty to defend in shared claim risk situations. I begin with the
conclusions reached by Professor Charles Silver and Dean Kent Syverud in
their recent analysis of the professional responsibilities of insurance
7
defense lawyers in full coverage cases and then extend those conclusions
to encompass the shared claim risk situations presented in my hypothetical
case s . For reasons that wil l be explained, I agree on insurance law grounds

with their conclusion that the insurance company i s entitled to limit the
scope o f the defense l awyer' s representation of the insured to minimizing
8
what I will call the "judgment risk" at issue in the claim.

Where I disagree with S ilver and Syverud i s with respect to the
company's responsibility for what I will call the "non-j udgment risk" faced
by the insured. I locate this responsibility in the company' s good faith
obligation to give equal consideration to the interests of the insured, and I
conclude that thi s obligation requires the company to retain the defense
lawyer to give primary consideration to the interests of the insured in
confli ct situations when "equal consideration" is an impossibility. Thus, I
9
ground what is sometimes called the primary client rule,
not in
professional responsibility law, but rather in insurance law.

7. See Silver & Syverud, supra n ote 5.
8. See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5 , at 296-3 0 1 . Silver and Syverud do not use the
claim risk framework, but I think they would agree with this characterizati on. "Judgment
risk" is the risk of having to pay all or part of a judgment entered in a claim. "Non
judgment risk" is every other kind of claim risk; it inc ludes the risk that the claim is not
covered (which I will cal l "coverage risk"), the risk that the company wil l not settle the
claim (which I will call "settlement risk"), and the risk of consequences other than
judgments, such as reputational harm (which I will call "other non-judgment risk"). Non
j udgment risk also includes defense costs, but because the company is conducting the
defense in the cases explored in this paper, defense costs are not part of the insured's non
judgment risk in these cases.
9. See S ilver & Syverud, supra note 5 , at 335 (criticizing the primary client rule and
proposing an alternative, non-subordination rule).

[Vol. 4:1
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I. A F RAMEWORK FOR ANALYZfNG INSURANCE D EFENS E CONFLICTS:
S HARED C LAIM RISK AND THE L IABILITY INSURANCE T ETRAH EDRON
Under the prevailing norms of insurance practice, the company' s
obligations t o the insured are analyzed within the framework o f contract
law, as that law has been developed in the context of standard form
10
insurance policie s .
Within that framework, the point of departure is the
insurance policy. Whatever else the company ' s obligations may be, those
obligations include what was promised in the form contract the company
chose to use .

With respect t o the company ' s obligation to defend, most l iability

insurance policies provide little more than the fol lowing:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because o f "bodily injury" or
"property damage" to which this insurance applies .

We

will have the right and duty to defend any "suit" seeking
those damages. We may at our discretion investigate any
"occurrence" and settle any claim or "suit" that may
11
result.
I n addition, these standard form policies contain provisions requiring
the insured to cooperate with the company and prohibiting the insured
12
These
from settling an insured claim without the company ' s consent.
provisions constitute the whole o f the language in the typical insurance
13
policy directly relating to defense obligations.

1 0. See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Claims Stories, Sales
Stories and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1 3 95 ( 1 994).
1 1 . ISO CGL 1 986. The wording in the standard automobile and homeowners'
insurance policies is essentially the same.
1 2 . "You and any other involved insured must . . . [c ]ooperate with us in the
investigation, settlement or defense of the claim or "suit" . . . No insureds will, except at
thei r own cost, voluntarily make a payment, assume any obligation, or incur any expense,
other than for first aid, without our consent." !d.
1 3 . The remainder of the policy principally addresses l imits on the company's duty to
indemnify and claiming conditions. Because the "duty to defend" appl ies only to suits
seeking damages for which the company would be obligated to indemnify �he i nsured, these
other provisions do relate indirectly to the duty to defend.
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Taken together, these standard form provisions mean that (in the
ordinary case) the insurance company

selects the

lawyer who

will

represent the insured, directs that lawyer' s handling of the case, and
14
controls the investigation, negotiation and settlement of the case .
Indeed,
an insured who interferes with the insurance company ' s right to defend or
15
discretion to settle risks losing insurance for that case.
These provisions
also mean, however, that the company has both a "duty to defend" and-
16
although this is not explicitly stated in the policy-a "duty to settle."

Thus,

the

insurance

contract

clearly

contemplates

the

defense

and

settlement of the insurance claim as the prerogative of the company, but it

also grants the insured a right to a defense and, in the appropriate
circumstance, to a settlement of the claim. If these latter rights are to have
any meaning, they must-and do--set some limits on the insurance
company ' s right to defend and settle .

A. Shared Claim Risk
In every case, the interests of the company and the insured diverge to
the following degree: absent reputational or some unusual concern of the
insured, she would prefer a company-funded settlement over further
litigation, no matter how unreasonable the plaintiff s demand; and, if there
is no settlement, the insured would prefer the company to spend more on
defense. This is an example of what economists call ex post moral hazard:

because the insurance company is paying for the settlement and defense,
the insured ' s incentives regarding the consequences of an allegedly
17
harmful event differ from what they would be if there were no insurance.
The insurance contract provisions granting the company control over

defense and settlement address that incentive problem.

prospective

A rational

insured would prefer a liability insurance contract giving the

1 4 . See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 265. This typical practice was also
confirmed to me in a series of interviews of South Florida personal injury lawyers. For a
description of these interviews, see Tom Baker, Transforming P unishment Into
Compensation: In the Shadow of Punitive Damages, 1 99 8 WIS. L. REv. ( forthcoming
Spring 1 998).
1 5 . See, e.g., Steen v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 442, N.W.2d 1 5 8 (Minn. Ct. App.
1 989).
1 6. See generally Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1 1 1 3 ( 1 990)
(explaining the company ' s duty to make reasonable efforts to settle a case within the policy
l imits i n order to protect the insured from a j udgment i n excess of the policy l imit).
1 7. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REv.
2 3 7, 269-70 ( 1 996) (describing ex ante and ex post moral hazard).
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company some such control, just as a rational prospective insured would
prefer a health insurance policy with a deductible or copayment provision
1
and some degree of oversight of the medical treatment. 8 Otherwise, the
insured would demand at the point of claim a level of defense that she
19
would not be willing to pay for at the time of purchasing the policy.

Indeed, from an insured ' s perspective, a l iabi lity insurance policy that

shifts the control over the defense and settlement of the c laim to the

company is much less threatening than a health insurance policy that shifts
control

over

defendant ' s

health

treatment.

In

(and

exclusive)

primary

often

the

ordinary

minimizing the cost of an adverse judgment.

l iability

concern

is

case,

avoiding

the
or

That concern easily can b e

transferred t o a n insurance company b y a contract that makes t h e company

l iabl e for paying the judgment. In contrast, the "health" that is the primary

concern of someone who buys health insurance cannot
transferred by contract.
As

this

suggests,

insurance

company

control

so easily be

presents

difficult

problems when the insurance contract does not transfer to the company all
the important risk affected by that control. That i s necessarily the case in
health insurance; no contract can ever transfer all the important risk
affected by control over health treatment . That is not necessarily the case
in

l iability

insurance;

liability insurance can come much

closer to

transferring all the important risk affected by the company ' s control over
the claim.

Yes, there are deductibles, and there can be difficulties

associated with being a defendant that are not eliminated by l iabi lity
insurance .

But, those deductibles and difficulties usually are relatively
20
insignificant, as least as compared to the risk of paying a judgment.
I call the risk that can be affected by the company ' s c ontrol over the

claim the "claim risk." C laim risk is the risk associated with a claim once

an event that may give rise to the c laim has occurred.

It includes all the

possible consequences of a claim, such as defense costs, payment to the
plaintiff, and loss of good will or reputational harm.

1 8 . For an analysis of the insurance/control nexus, see Tom Baker, Torts, Insurance
and Soci al Control in the Age of Managed Care (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
1 9 . See Baker, supra note 1 7, at 268.
20. Where the deductible is very high, as is increasingly the case i n the maj or corporate
liabi lity context, the insurance agreements do not transfer control over defense and
settlement to the company. This paper does not address that context. It is concerned solely
with traditional liability insurance policies that transfer control to the company.
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An insurance contract does not (and cannot) transfer all the important

risk of an inj ury-causing activity, but it can (and sometimes even does)
trans fer all the important claim risk.

For example, in the automobile

context the risk of driving includes the risk of harm to the insured driver.
That is a risk that not even the most generous insurance policy can transfer
completely to an insurance company, because money simply cannot fully
compensate an insured for injury to his or her body.

But, by agreeing to

cover all the costs of defense and to pay any liability claims, an automobile
liability insurance policy can transfer essentially all the important
risk associated with driving. 2 1

claim

O f course, the fact that the liability insurance company can bear

essentially all the important claim risk does not mean that it always does
so. The insured can retain significant claim risk for at least three reasons:
dollar limits on the amount of coverage provided by the insurance policy,

uncertainty over insurance coverage for the claim, and the potential for the
plaintiff to cause the insured a significant kind of harm that is not covered
by the insurance policy, such as reputational harm or, in some states,
22
punitive damages.
In these shared claim risk situations, the company ' s
control over defense and settlement can provide the opportunity t o shift
claim risk to the insured .

Thus, unlike the paradigm liability insurance

defense situation-where the ex post moral hazard we worry about is that

of the insured-shared claim risk cases present a dual moral hazard
23 .

problem.

B. The Liability Insurance Tetrahedron

In teaching and thinking about insurance, I find it helpful to use

geometric figures.

The triangle below represents the liability insurance

relationship when the company faces all the important claim risk in the
24
case, which is understood to be the usual case.
In this situation, we can
think of the interests of the company and the insured as having merged .

2 1 . The possible exception is the risk of future premium increases under an experience
rated i nsurance policy.
22. See Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1 99 8 Wrs. L.
REV. (forthcoming Spring 1 998).
2 3 . See Baker, supra note 1 7, at 274 n. l 8 1 (collecting dual moral hazard literature).
24. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 263 .
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Plaintiff

Company
Lawyer
(Insured..u-------�
FIGURE2

In thi s relationship, we usually think of the company and the insurance
defense lawyer allied against the plaintiff; thus, some readers may resist
thinking of this relationship as triangular.

Yet, as any insurance defense

l awyer or insurance adjuster can attest, the relationship between the
company and the lawyer can involve conflict even in a case in which the
25
company bears all the claim risk.
The conflict principally revolves around defense fee s .

The company

has an interest in reducing defense costs that is not shared by the lawyer.
The plaintiff can use that interest to obtain a settlement that reflects, not
only the risk of an adverse j udgment, but also the costs of defense . Thus,
this relationship presents an opportunity for the company and p laintiff to
benefit at the "expense" of the lawyer.
There is also a potential community of interest between the plaintiff

and the defense lawyer.

B oth plaintiff and lawyer have an interest in the
26
the lawyer to bill the fi le,
and the

continued existence of a claim:

plaintiff to keep alive the possibility of payment. In the normal situation,

we expect this potential community of interest to be overwhe lmed by the
lawyer ' s interest in proving her or his worth to the company by dispatching

2 5 . See, e.g., Anonymous, What Many of Us Really Think but are Afraid to Say, FOR
THE D EF., July 1 993, at 2 ("From an economic standpoint, your law firm's interests are not
necessarily the same as the insurance carriers. Where a case can be settled to eliminate your
bill, they are going to do it."); Donald W. Rees & Robert F. Hall, Communicating with the
Insurer Consumer, FOR THE DEF . , Sept. 1 994, at 4.
26. This interest assumes an hourly fee arrangement. Paying lawyers on a capitation or
flat fee basis changes the incentives present in the relationship. Thi s paper focuses
exclusively on the incentive associated with hourly fees and does not address different fee
arrangements or the incentives associated with those arrangements.

1997]
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the claim. Nevertheless, this potential alliance appears to have resulted in
fraud on the company.

27

When the insured and the company share claim risk, the picture is

more complicated.

Instead of three relevant parties with potentially

conflicting interests, there are four: the company, the insured, the defense
lawyer and the plaintiff. The figure below shows the triangle from above
"opened up" to reflect the conflict between the company and insured that
results from the shared claim risk.

27. See Peter Carbonara, Fleecing insurance Companies, California-Style, AM. LAW.,
Apr. 1 990, at 5 2 (describing alleged fraud by a group of l awyers known as "the Alliance");
Alfred G. Haggerty, Fireman's Fund, A llstate Settle with Three RICO Suit Lawyers, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, Nov. 5, 1 990, at 4 (reporting settlement by three alleged members of the
al l i ance). This example involves independent counsel selected by the insured pursuant to
Cali fornia's Cumis statute. CAL. Clv. CODE § 2860 (West 1 993). The conflict between
lawyer and company is less acute when the company chooses the defense l awyer, but it does
not go away. See Anonymous, supra note 25, and Rees & Hal l , supra note 2 5 .
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If we plot the relationships between these four in three dimensions, the
geometric figure that results is a tetrahedron--which I think of as a three
dimensional triangle (and which I visualize by thinking of a pyramid with a
28
triangular base).
Appendix A shows the liability insurance tetrahedron in

2 8 . The fol lowing picture is a three-dimensional representation o f the l iabil ity
insurance tetrahedron :
Plaintiff

6

I nsuced
Defendant Company

L'wye<
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a form that can be copied, enlarged, and then cut out and assembled into a
three dimensional tetrahedron for individual use.
Each of the four faces of the tetrahedron represents a facet of the
liability insurance relationship.

The "professional responsibility triangle"

represents the relationship between the company, the lawyer, and the
insured.

The "jury triangle" represents the relationship between the three

parties that a jury deciding a liability c laim would see : the insured, the
plaintiff and the defense lawyer.

The "settlement triangle" represents the

relationship between the three parties that, ordinarily, are directly involved
in the settlement of the case: the company, the plaintiff, and the defense
29
lawyer.
And the "plaintiffs choice triangle" represents the relationship

between the company, the plaintiff and the insured.

Each of these

components of this relationship is characterized by the kinds of tensions
that I began to explore in discussing the company-lawyer-plaintiff triangle
above.

II. EXPLORING THE LIABILITY INSURANCE T ETRAHEDRON THROUGH
PATT E RN CONFLICT CASES
The liability insurance paradigm-in which the company controls the
defense and settlement of claims using a single lawyer who represents both
the company and the insured--is based on the assumption that in most
cases the interests of the company and the insured do not fundamentally
conflict.

In other words, the l iability insurance paradigm is based on an

assumption that the company bears all the important claim risk.
insurance

contracts

are

theoretically

capable

of transferring

Liability
all

i mportant claim risk from the insured to the insurance company.

the

The

degree to which existing liability insurance contracts approach this goal i s

a n empirical question to which w e do not have a rigorous answer.

It is

clear, however, that liability insurance contracts d o not always transfer all
the important claim risk faced by insureds.

While we cannot say what

percentage of actually filed insurance claims involve shared claim risk, we

can identify with some confidence the patterns of these cases according to

the reasons underlying the sharing of claim risk.

29. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 295 (stating that the defense lawyer will
usual ly be retained to represent the company at settlement); see also, Keeton, supra note 3,
at 1 1 68-7 1 (arguing that defense counsel may represent the company and not the insured for
settlement purposes).
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the dollar limits of the

insurance policy are less than the potential damages at issue in the claim;
(2) substantive limits on the coverage provided by the insurance policy
make the company's obligation to pay all or part of the claim doubtful or
uncertain; and

(3)

the plaintiff has the potential to cause the defendant a

kind of harm that is not covered by the insurance policy. The analysis that
follows explores three sets of hypothetical cases that illustrate these
patterns, using the framework developed in Part I.

A. Shared Claim Risk Resulting from Dollar Limits
In the first set of pattern cases, the insured and the company share the
claim risk because of dollar limits on the coverage provided by the liability
insurance policy.

1. The Low Limits Case

An individual insured with a $100,000 limit liability
insurance policy cut off a stranger's foot with a lawn
mower. The stranger filed suit seeking $1 million and then
offered to settle the case for $100,000.
In the Low Limits Case, the insured bears significant claim risk
because the potential damages exceed the limits of the insurance policy.
This case presents a well known conflict of interest:

in the absence of

some insurance law intervention, the company has only its subsequent
defense costs to lose when it turns down a policy-limits settlement offer.
Courts have described this situation as presenting the company with the
30
opportunity to "gamble with the insured's money."
Courts have

attempted to resolve this conflict by requiring

the

insurance company to act "as if' there were no insurance limits when
31
This duty means that the company has
evaluating a settlement proposal.
a duty to accept a reasonable settlement offer within the policy limits, and

30. See, e.g. , Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 23 F.3d I 1 75 , I 1 79
(7th Cir. 1 994 ) ; see also M urphy v. A l lstate I ns. Co., 1 3 2 Cal. Rptr. 424, 426 ( 1 976) ("the
duty to settle is implied in l aw to protect the insured from exposure to li ability i n excess of
coverage as a result of the insurer's gambl e--on which only the insured might lose").
3 1 . See Syverud, supra note 16, at 1 1 22-26 (describing competing standards for
eval uating whether company should be held l iable for fai lure to settle a c laim). The
company may also have the duty to offer the policy l imits to settle the appropriate case. See
Coleman v. Holecek, 542 F.2d 532, 5 3 7 ( 1 Oth Cir. 1 976) ("the duty to settle does not hi nge
on the existence of a settlement offer from the plai ntiff').
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i f the company breaches that duty, it will be l iable for the full amount of
2
This duty to
any subsequent judgment in the case against the insured. 3
settle increases the company ' s incentive to settle a case and, thus, reduces

the risk of an uninsured excess judgment. It does not, however, eliminate

that risk. There remains the possibility that the company will not settle a

case within policy limits and that a jury will conclude that the company
made every reasonable effort to do so.
Thus, notwithstanding the insurance law "solution" to the conflict of

interest, the company and the insured stil l share the claim risk in a low
l imits case.

Moreover, when the value of the case exceeds the policy

limits, the company lacks the usual incentive to defend the case at a level
that i s proportional to the damages at stake.

Indeed, once it becomes

reasonably clear that the company will have to pay the full limits of the
policy in the case, the company ' s indemnity obligation provides little
financial incentive to defend the case.
These residual conflicts between the company and the insured have
consequences within each facet of the l iability insurance tetrahedron.

In

the context of the plaintiff's choice triangle (company-plaintiff-insured),
the conflict has the potential to weaken the usual alliance between the
company and insured and to create an alliance between plainti ff and
insured in favor of a settlement.

The insured wants the case to settle to

avoid the risk of an uncovered judgement; the plaintiff would like a quick
resolution of the case, preferably at a premium. 33
In the context of the professional responsibility triangle (company
insured-lawyer) , the conflict gives the company an incentive to manage the
defense in a way that shifts more of the claim risk to the insured. This can
happen in at least two ways.

First, the company can use its control over

the l iabi lity case to strengthen its position in any subsequent fai lure to

settle case. For example, the company could direct the defense lawyer not

to arrive at an opinion regarding the value of the case or not to create any
documents stating possible verdicts in the case, or the company could
instruct the defense lawyer to minimize the value of the case in documents

32. See Syverud, supra note 1 6, at 1 1 20-2 1 .
3 3 . In light of the rule that the company will be liable for excess verdicts when it has
the opportunity to obtain a reasonable settlement within the limits, the conflict between the
company and the insured is most acute in situations in which a within-limits settlement
demand is not clearly reasonable. A rational plaintiff would use that conflict as a pressure
point to obtain a settlement at the high end of what is reasonable.
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Such directions would make it more difficult for the

insured to prevail in a subsequent failure to settle case . By inhibiting the
defense lawyer ' s ability to communicate her perspective on the case to the

relevant decision makers in the company, such directions may also reduce

the probability that the company settles the case.

S econd, the company can shift risk to the insured by shirking in the
defense of the case . This seems most likely to occur in a case in which the
value of the case c learly exceeds the limits of the policy and there is no
opportunity to settle within limits. But, even when there is an opportunity
to settle (as in the Low Limits case), a company that turns down that
opportunity is only contingently liable for all the damages at stake and thus
has less incentive to defend the case at the level proportional to those
damages than would a solvent, uninsured defendant.

The lawyer' s interests in this conflict may at first appear contradictory.
On the one hand, the lawyer ' s interests clearly lie with the insured in favor
of a strong defense and against company shirking. On the other hand , the
lawyer' s interests lie with the company in favor of litigation and against
settlement.

Of course, it is quite possible for the lawyer to satisfy both

these interests: opposing settlement and insisting on a thorough defense of
the liability claim. 3 5
The conflict between the company and insured also has a potential

spillover effect in the jury triangle (insured-lawyer-plaintiff), where it has
the potential to create an alliance between the insured and the plaintiff
against the lawyer.

settle .

Both the insured and the plaintiff want the case to

The more the lawyer is seen as resisting settlement and siding

"with" the company "against" the insured, the stronger the plaintiff-insured
alliance .

For this reason, plaintiffs ' lawyers sometimes prepare demand
6
letters aimed as much at the insured as the lawyer or company. 3 One goal
of such letters is to induce the insured to retain personal counsel who may,

34. In an interview conducted under a condition of anonymity for another project, a
defense lawyer reported that he was instructed by an insurance company not to make a
written assessment of likely damages or settlement numbers in cases he handles for them, in
order to make it more difficult for insureds to prevail in fai lure to settle cases. Interview
with lnsumnce Defense Lawyoc (name confidential), in M i ami, Fla. (May 1 7, 1 996). Fm a
description of the interviews, see generally Baker, supra note 1 4.
3 5 . This i s an example of a situation where an alternative fee arrangement could create
a different incentive. Were the law firm paid a flat fee to handle a given percentage of the
company ' s litigated cases, the firm would n ot have a fee-based incentive to oppose a
settlement in a particular case.
3 6 . See Baker, supra note 1 4.
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in effect, work with the plaintiff to pressure the lawyer and the company to
7
settle the claim. 3
If the company does not settle the case and a large

judgment results, the insured and the plaintiff may then ally against the
lawyer in a much more concrete fashion:

the insured settles with the

plaintiff, assigns to the plaintiff the insured ' s rights against the lawyer and
the company, and then assists the plaintiff in a failure to settle suit against
the company.

Lurking in the background is a potential malpractice claim

against the lawyer.
Considering

the

jury

and

professional

responsibility

triangles

simultaneously, we can see how tensions in one facet of the liability
insurance relationship can affect another.

An important concern with

respect to the professional responsibility triangle is that the lawyer ' s long

term economic dependence on the company gives the lawyer an incentive
to favor the company against the insured.

This concern plays out in the

j ury triangle as the wedge the plaintiff uses to attempt to split the lawyer
and the insured. At the same time, however, the ability of the plaintiff and
the insured to ally against the lawyer in the jury triangle may play out in
the professional responsibility triangle by giving the lawyer an incentive

not to favor the company over the insured.

In the event of a large,

uncovered excess verdict, the lawyer is a potential deep pocket target .
This personal risk may lead the lawyer t o bond more tightly with the
insured, and, by extension, even the plaintiff .

The conflict between company and insured also has contradictory
potential in the settlement triangle (plaintiff, lawyer, company), assuming,
of course, that the lawyer handles the settlement on behalf of the company.
Provided that the settlement offer is not clearly reasonable, it is in the

interest of both the lawyer and the company to resist settlement: the
company to avoid paying more than it is legally obligated to pay, and the
lawyer to continue receiving fees for the defense of the case. Two factors

mitigate against this alliance between lawyer and company, however. The

personal risk of the lawyer described above may lead the lawyer to favor
settlement when the company would not.

Moreover, to the extent that the

resolution of the conflict in the professional responsibility triangle results
in a more expensive defense, the company ' s incentive to settle will closer
approach that of the plaintiffs, thus increasing the community of interest

3 7 . !d.
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between company and plainti ff "against" the lawyer in f avor of avoiding
defense costs. 3 8
2. The Multiple Victim Case

An insured with an automobile liability insurance policy
with a $300,000 per accident limit caused a multiple car
accident. Three family members seriously injured in one
of the cars filed suit before any of the other victims. The
three immediately offer to settle for $300,000.
This case is a variation on a low limits case. I use this case to correct
any misimpression that it is always the insured who pushes to settle a low
limits case.

It would be in the company' s interest to exhaust the policy

limits by settling and thereby save the costs of continuing to defend the
insured. The insured would like to keep the company-paid defense until all
the cases arising out of the accident are resolved.

In both this case and the Low Limits Case just considered, the conflict

between the company and the insured arises from the lack o f adequate
insurance. In the Multiple Victim Case, however, the company is the one
motivated to settle, not the insured.

This difference has consequences

within each aspect of the liability insurance relationship.
Consider first the plaintiff' s choice triangle.

As in the Low Limits

Case, the conflict between the insured and the company threatens the usual
bond between the company and the insured.

This time, however, the

potential alliance is between these first three plaintiffs and the company.
Now the reason for calling this the "plaintiff' s choice" tri angle becomes

cl ear. A conflict between the company and the insured provides a plainti ff

with a potential ally where, before, there were two opponents. In the Low
Limits Case the potential ally was the insured.

Here, the potential ally is

the company.
Whether the plaintiff chooses an alliance in any particular case and, if
so, with whom, depends on the situation.

Case.

Consider first the Low Limits

If the insured has significant, collectible assets, a rational plaintiff

would have l ittle interest in an alliance with the insured against the
company

to

promote

a

within-limits

settlement-unless

either

the

3 8 . This will be espec ially true when the insured has l i ttle or no personal assets,
because the lack of assets does not relieve the company of the duty to settle, but it
dramatically reduces the plaintiffs interest i n an excess judgment. See Steele v . Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 44 1 , 446-48 ( 7th Cir. 1 9 8 6) ( Posner, J .).
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plaintiff ' s case on liability is weak or the damages are unlikely to exceed
39
If the insured does not have significant collectible

the policy limits.

assets, however, a rational plaintiff would have great interest in an alliance
40
with the insured in favor of settlement, regardless of the strength of the
case or the size of the damages in relation to the policy limits .
The Multiple Victim Case presents the plaintiff with a similar choice .
If the insured has significant, collectible assets, a rational plaintiff would
have no interest in an alliance with the company to promote a quick
settlement-unless, once again, either the plaintiff s case on liability is
weak or the damages are unlikely to exceed the policy limits .

But, i f the

insured does not have significant, collectible assets, a rational plaintiff
would have great interest in an alliance in favor of settlement (this time, of
course, with the company), regardless of the strength of the case or the size
of the damages in relation to the policy limits .
Court s ' treatment of settlements i n multiple victim cases reflects the
dynamics of this "plaintiff s choice."

The black letter standard remains
41
what Keeton called the "more rustic rule, ' first come, first served ' " -

meaning that the company may settle individual claim s in a manner that
42
leaves less insurance money for later claimants.
Nevertheless, that rule
has been qualified over time to protect both the insured and other claimants
from opportunistic plaintiffs and companies . When the insured has assets,
it is the insured who needs protection from a colluding plaintiff and
43
company ; the duty of good faith provides that insured some protection.
When the insured does not have assets, it is the other victims who need
protection; the mandatory allocation of the available insurance to all
victims

required in

some j urisdictions

provides

those

victims

some

3 9 . In either of those two cases, the plaintiff may bel i eve that an alliance with the
i nsured against the company would make it possible to obta in a more generous settlement
than would be possible if there were no i nsurance.
40. The a l l i ance would seem to be the strongest in cases in which the insured defendant
has some assets (and thus some i nterest in avoiding an excess verdict), but not enough to
j ustify great effort on the part of the plaintiff.
4 1 . See Robert E. Keeton, Preferential Settlement of Liability Insurance Claims, 70
H ARV. L. REV. 27, 38 ( 1 9 56).
42. See, e.g., A l l state Ins. Co. v. Evans, 409 S . E.2d 273, 274 (Ga. Ct. App. 1 99 1 ).
43. \)'hi le the contours of "bad faith" in this context are far from settled, a dec ision in
Massachusetts suggestd that settling quickly with one c l aimant and leaving the insured to
defend remaining cases on i ts own woul d constitute bad faith. See Voccio v. Rel iance Ins.
Co., 703 F.2d I , 3 -4 ( 1 st Cir. 1 9 83) (dicta that insurance company could be l i able if a
settlement with one plaintiff caused an excess verdict by another).

[Vo l . 4: I
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As in the Low Limits case, then, insurance law resists the

detrimental consequences of opportuni stic behavior by the company.
Nevertheless, insurance law does not (and cannot) eliminate the conflict
between the companies and insureds that results from there being too l ittle
m surance.
Consider next the professional

responsibility triangle

(company

lawyer-insured) . The conflict in the Multiple Victim Case has at l east the
potential to strengthen the bond between the insured and the lawyer. B oth
the l awyer and the insured have an interest in the company continuing to
pay to defend the case, an interest which conflicts with the company ' s
interest in terminating its involvement i n the claim. Thi s common interest
may not overcome the lawyer' s economic dependence on the comp any, but
it provides an incentive to manage that dependent relationship in a way

that keeps this case alive (for example, by bringing to the company ' s

attention the case law indicating that there i s some risk t o a company that
pursues a settle and exit strategy) .
From analyzing j ust these two pattern conflict cases we can see that the
lawyer' s position in the professional responsibility triangle is similar in
some ways to the plaintiffs position in the plaintiffs choice triangle . The
conflict between the company and the insured provides the lawyer with a
potential opponent, where before there were two allies.

Thus, we might

call the professional responsibility triangle the "lawyer ' s choice triangle"
and anticipate that the lawyer' s choice, like the plaintiffs, would depend
on the lawyer ' s interest in the situation.

"Lawyer ' s choice" is not,

however, a comfortabl e way of thinking about this situation . Indeed, one
of the goals of insurance and professional responsibility law in this

situation is precisely to dictate the "choice" that the lawyer must make and
to structure the l iab ility insurance relationship in such a way that the

lawyer does not have an unobserved opportunity to make a contrary

choice.

As in the Low Limits Case, the conflict between the company and the
insured in the Multiple Victim C ase has spillover effects in the j ury

44. See, e.g., Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc., 3 5 5 So. 2d 1 279, 1 28 8 ( La. 1 977) (interpreting
direct action statute to prohibit company from exhausting an automobile insurance policy by
settling with less than all the victims of an accident); Dom v. Liberty M ut. Fire Ins. Co., 40 1
N . W . 2d 662, 663 (M inn. 1 9 87) (interpreting uninsured motorist statute to prohibit company
from exhausting the policy by settling with less than all the victims of an acci dent); see also
M iller v. Lambert, 464 S.E.2d 582 (W. Va. 1 995). This goes some way toward achieving
Keeton 's preferred solution: a court-ordered allocati on of policy proceeds according to the
"relative settlement value of all claims." Keeton, supra note 4 1 , at 52.
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triangles.

and

settlement

121

(plaintiff-lawyer-company)

In contrast to the Low Limits Case, however, the incentives

strengthen the bond between insured and lawyer against the plaintiff in the
jury triangle and weaken the bond between company and lawyer against
the plaintiff in the settlement triangle. The result is that the l awyer in the

Multiple Victim Case has more incentive to advocate for the insured at the
45
settlement table than the lawyer in the Low Limits Case.
These spillover
effects are further examples of the effect that the dynamics in one
component of the l iability insurance relationship can have on others . They
also i l lustrate the important point that the self interest of the lawyer may
mitigate the effect that the lawyer' s long term economic dependence on the
insurance company has on the lawyer ' s relationship with the insured. This

may explain the relative paucity of pub li shed opinions in which insureds
46
chall enge a company ' s early settlement of a multiple victim case.

B. Shared Claim Risk Resulting from Insurance Coverage

Uncertainty
In the second set of pattern cases, the insured and the company share
the claim risk because there is some uncertainty whether the potential
damages are covered by the insurance policy.

1 . The Misrepresentation Case

In investigating a serious, but otherwise routine "slip and
fall " involving a repairman at the home of an insured with
adequate liability insurance for the resulting claim. the
company discovered that the insured had been conducting
business at the home, despite having answered "no " to a
question in the policy application regarding business at
the home. The company undertook the defense of the
insured, but reserved the right to contest its obligation to
pay any judgment on misrepresentation grounds.

4 5 . Once again, a l awyer whose fees are not based on the number of hours worked may
have a different incentive.
46. None of the cases cited in Annotation, Basis and Manner of Distribution Among
Multiple Claimants of Proceeds of Liability Insurance Policy Inadequate to Pay Claims in
Full, 70 A. L.R. 2d 4 1 6 ( 1 960), and in the supplements to that annotation through 1 996,
were brought by insureds to recover money paid to claimants. Instead, the cases all are
brought by victims who were not fully compensated.

.�

j
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In the Misrepresentation Case, the insured and the company share the
claim risk because of the uncertainty over insurance coverage for the

claim. Here the interests of the company and the insured in the defense of

the l iability claim appear to be aligned: both the company and the insured
would be better off if the repairman ' s claim went away; the limits of the
policy exceed the damages claimed; and there is no obvious way that the
company

could

use

the

control

over

the

claim

to

improve

its

misrepresentation defense. Thus, the conflict between the insured and the
company appears to concern only the coverage for the claim.

Nevertheless, the interests of the company and the insured do conflict
in the defense and settlement of the liability claim, because the claim and
the coverage defense intersect in the company ' s valuation of the c laim. As
a result of the coverage defense , a rational company will value the
Misrepresentation Case at a discount.

The stronger the company ' s

misrepresentation defense, the larger the discount. The larger the discount,
the less incentive the insurance company has to mount a vigorous defense
or settle the liability case. Although the company and the insured share the
risk of having to pay an actual j udgment, the company, alone, control s the
settlement process. Accordingly, as in the Low Limits Case, the company
has an opportunity to "gamble with the insured ' s money."

In the Low Limits Case, the company would have none of its own

money to lose if it refused to settle (ignoring for the moment both defense
costs and the duty to settle). In the Misrepresentation Case, in contrast, the
company does risk its own money.

If the company i s wrong about the

value of the liability case and the coverage defense, it will have to pay a

j udgment in excess of the settlement amount.

Using the gambling

metaphor, then, we can say that a low limits case offers the company the
opportunity to place a bet using only the insured ' s money, while a
47
coverage defense case requires it to bet some of its own money, too.
Nevertheless, a significant conflict of interest remains.

there is a

50%

chance of a

$ 1 00,000

verdict and

50%

Imagine that

verdict, so that we can say that the settlement value of the case is
If we also imagine that there is a

50%

$0
$50,000.

chance of a

chance that the company will

prevail in a coverage case, then the company should be willing to pay no

4 7. Factoring in defense costs reduces the differences between the two types of
confl icts. The more significant the defense costs are to the overall cost of the claim, the
more the confl ict present in a l ow l imits case approaches the conflict present in a coverage
defense case like the M isrepresentation Case ( i . e. , in which there is no factual overlap
between the li ability claim and the coverage defense).

·I

j
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to settle the case (ignoring defense and coverage

litigation costs, which complicate the analysis without changing the point).
As long as the insured has collectible assets, it would be irrational for the
plaintiff to settle the case for that amount .

Any resulting three-way

settlement negotiation between the p laintiff, the insured and the company
presents obvious opportunities for conflict between the company and the
insured.
In practice, insureds appear not to contribute to settlements within
policy limits, at least outside the realm of large scale corporate insurance
coverage litigation (for example, mass products liability or environmental
49
48
Yet, such cases do settle.
claims) .
Does that mean that plaintiffs ignore
defendants ' other assets, that insurance companies ignore their coverage
defenses, or that there is some other dynamic at work? Empirical research
directed at answering these questions would help us better understand the
role of liability insurance in tort law-in-action.
Even without such research, however, it is clear that at least one reason
for the lack of contributions by insureds to within-limit settlements is the
existence of cases holding that it is a breach of the company's duty of good
faith to require the insured to pay a portion of a settlement within limits. 5 °
The apparent concern is that the company will use its lower risk aversion
and greater experience at valuing claims to profit at the insured ' s expense.
Playing the settlement and coverage numbers is the company's business,
not the insured 's.

Indeed, the insured 's aversion to having to play those

numbers is one of the pillars of the liability insurance business. 5 1

48. See Syverud, supra note 1 6, at 1 1 56. M y interviews with personal inj ury lawyers
corroborated Syverud ' s report. See Baker, supra note 1 4, for a description of the interviews.
Not one of the lawyers reported having handled or heard of a personal injury case involving
an individual or small business insured in which the in sured had contri buted to a "within
limits" settlement. I am aware of insured contributions to "within lim its" settlements in the
large scale corporate coverage l i tigation context from my personal involvem ent in such
cases. The details of the settlements cannot be provided because of confi dential i ty
provisions in the settlement agreements.
49. All of the personal i nj ury lawyers interviewed said that it was common practice for
insurance companies in Florida to settle contested coverage cases. See Baker, supra note 1 4
(describing the interviews).
50. See Syverud, supra note 1 6, at 1 1 5 3-57.
5 1 . The presence of such settlements i n the large corporate context is consistent with
this explanation because, in that context, there is much less risk that a court will act in a
paternalistic m anner to protect the insured.
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For present purposes, we need not decide whether this paternalistic
52
prohibition is good or bad policy.
It i s enough to realize that, as this
prohibition reflects, a coverage defense changes the insurance relationship
so that the insured and company become adversaries, not only with respect
to coverage, but also with respect to the defense and settlement of the
claim.

Structurally, the conflict in the Misrepresentation Case i s more l ike the

conflict in the Low Limits Case than the conflict in the Multiple Victim
Case.

The confl ict in the Misrepresentation Case encourages an alliance

between the insured and the plaintiff in favor of settlement, leaving the
company out in the plaintiffs choice triangle and leaving the lawyer out in
the jury triangle .

Indeed, because the insurance l imits are more than

adequate for the c laim, this alliance has the potential to exist even when
there is a deep pocket defendant.
alliance

between

the

insured

In addition, the conflict encourages an
and

the

lawyer

in

the

professional

responsibility triangle opposing efforts by the company to shirk in the
defense and maybe even, for the reasons explored below, in favor of
settlement.
In the settlement triangle, the lawyer ' s interests would seem to run
squarely with the

company against the plaintiff (and,

thus,

against

settlement unless the plainti ff is willing to reduce the settlement value of
the case to reflect the coverage uncertainty). What may weaken the bond
between company and lawyer, however, is the lawyer' s risk aversion.

If

the claim results in a large, covered verdict, the lawyer may not receive the

next file from the company. If the case results in an uncovered verdict, the
lawyer may be on the receiving end of legal proceedings: at best a

deposition notice in a fai lure to settle case against the company; at worst a

complaint in a malpractice case.

A settlement ends the case on a less than disastrous note for all the

people directly involved:
and the lawyer.

the plaintiff, the defendant, the claims adjuster,

For this reason, some lawyers assert that contested

coverage cases are more likely to settle than uncontested coverage

52. At least in the abstract, such settlements could be in the i nsured ' s interest, in effect
providing the insured the opportunity to purchase insurance against the risk of losing the
liability claim and the subsequent coverage case. Cf Syverud, supra note 1 6, at 1 1 5 7
(observing that contri butions b y insureds to within limits settlements can b e understood i n
the context o f a low limits case a s insurance "against the risk of a n excess judgment").

I
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3
cases 5 -this notwithstanding my earlier observation that the settlement
value of the case to the company would seem to be much lower than the
settlement value of the case to the plaintiff. True or not,54 this assertion
suggests, once again, that the common assumption that it is in the lawyer' s

interest to align with the company against the insured may not always hold
true.

2. The Separation Assault
Following a legal separation in an abusive marriage, the
insured regularly stalked his wife. One evening, in a
drunken rage, the insured shot his wife 's boyfriend and
then himself Both survived. The boyfriend filed suit
against the husband, who requested a defense from his
homeowners ' insurance company. The company agreed to
defend the case, but reserved the right to contest its
obligation to pay any judgment on the grounds that the
husband intended the harm. 55

This case presents the same settlement and defense confl icts as the

Misrepresentation Case, plus an additional conflict arising from the factual
overlap between the liability and coverage aspects of the case.

The

company would benefit from a factual finding in the liability case that the
insured shot the boyfriend with the intent sufficient to meet the standard
for the company' s intentional harm defense. For the insured, that finding

would be a disaster, leading to both a large adverse judgment and the loss

53. See, e.g., Interview with Insurance Defense Lawyer (name confidential), in M iami,
Fla. (May I, 1 996). For a description of the interviews, see B aker, supra note 1 4.
54. This is a question that is ripe for empirical testing. U nlike many such questions, i t
actually seems testable. Indeed, as l ong a s a company ' s claim data base contains a field
indicating whether a reservation of rights letter was sent and a field indicating whether the
case settled before trial, running a simple cross tabulation would be easy.
5 5 . This hypothetical is loosely modeled on State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wicka, 474
N. W.2d 324 (Minn. 1 99 1 ). The court in Wicka affirmed a j udgment against the insurance
company, based on a jury finding that the assailant lacked the capacity to form the intent
necessary to bring the case within the scope of the expected or intended exclusion. If we
understand that exclusion to address the problem of moral hazard-changed behavior
attributable to insurance--then a very high standard of intent in such separation assault
coverage disputes is good policy, because it is highly unlikely that separation assaults are
affected by insurance incentives.

1

j
j
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coverage . 5

6

Thus,

this

case

di ffers

structurally

from

the

Misrepresentation Case because there i s a potential community o f interest
between the plaintiff and the company:

provided the insured has other

collectible assets, both company and plaintiff gain by proving that the
7
insured intended to harm the plaintiff. 5
In the professional responsibility triangle, the insured and the lawyer
share an interest in preventing the company from shirking in the defense,
and the lawyer has a long term interest in assisting the company.

In this

sense, the Separation Assault is no different than the other pattern cases .
But, t h e Separation Case is like the Low Limits Case (and unlike the
Multiple Victim and Misrepresentation cases) in that it presents the lawyer
with the opportunity to further both interests: receiving fees for a thorough
defense of the liability claim while helping the company shift c laim risk to
the insured.
The Separation Assault case differs from the Low Limits Case,
however, in terms of the pressure exerted by relationships outside the
professional responsibility triangle. In the Low Limits Case, the potential
alliance between the insured and plaintiff against the lawyer tempered the
lawyer ' s interest in helping the company shift claim risk to the insured.
Here, in contrast, if the plaintiff prefers an alliance with the company, the
plaintiff will not pressure the lawyer to place the insured ' s interests ahead
of the company ' s . Indeed, the logical extension of the lawyer ' s economic
dependence on the company and the company ' s alliance with the plaintiff
would be for the lawyer in effect to work with the plaintiff against the
insured in the jury triangle.
Accordingly, the

Separation Assault

Case presents

the

strongest

potential constellation of interests against the insured yet seen: two against
one in the plaintiff' s

choice

triangle, the professional responsibility

triangle and even the jury triangle. And, in contrast to the prior cases, no
one may be pressing for a settlement in the settlement triangl e .

Thus, i t is not surprising that many jurisdictions have adopted a shift in

control strategy to assist the insured in this kind of case.

In these

56. Even if the j urisdiction did not permit offensive collateral estoppel, the finding in
the first case would affect the settlement value of the coverage case: the fact that one j ury
found that the insured intended the harm clearly would affect the lawyers' eval uation of
whether a second j ury would do so and thereby reduce the settlement value of the coverage
claim.
5 7 . If the i nsured lacks significant collectible assets, the likely alliance is between
insured and plaintiff, with the result that the interests would more nearly match those in the
M isrepresentati on Case.
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jurisdictions, when a company raises a coverage defense that turns on

issues that are relevant to the liability claim, the company gives up the

right to defend the insured. 5 8

Of course, this means the insured now

controls the defense at the company ' s expense, raising the ex post moral

hazard problem that motivated the insurance contract provi sions assigning
control to the insurance company.

Perhaps as a result, insurance law

seems to tolerate the company placing some limits on the defense, such as

requiring the insured ' s lawyer to accept payment at the company ' s usual
9
rate and that the l awyer be experienced in defending civil claims . 5
If the shift in control is only partial, so that the company retains control

over settlement of the claim, a significant settlement conflict remains. As

with the defense conflict just discussed , this settlement conflict is more
acute than the corresponding conflict in the Mi srepresentation Case .

Keeping the l iability case "alive" in the S eparation Assault C ase benefits
the company in a way that keeping the liability case alive in the

Misrepresentation Case does not.

As long as the Separation Assault

l iab ility case continues, there remains the chance that the plaintiff will
reveal or prove facts helpful to the company ' s coverage defense. Once the
plaintiff settles with the insured, however, the plaintiff is no longer adverse
to the insured and, thus, wil l be less helpful to the company ' s position
against the insured.

As a result, the company has less incentive in the

Separation Case to reach a settlement with the insured and the plaintiff that
resolves at least the l iability aspects of the case .

By contrast, in the

Misrepresentation Case, if the parties can agree on the value of the liability
claim, it may be in both the company ' s and the plainti ff s interest to settle

that claim and then l itigate the real issue :
coverage for the claim.

whether there is insurance

3. The Softball Case

The company hired a lawyer to defend what seemed to be
a routine negligence claim filed by a spectator injured at a
high school softball game. During informal interviews,
two potential witnesses told the defense lawyer that the
insured had deliberately thrown her bat at the plaintiff,
who had been heckling the insured. The lawyer talked to
5 8 . See, e.g., CAL . Clv. CODE § 2 8 6 0 (West 1 993); Thornton v . Paul, 3 84 N.E.2d 3 3 5
( I l l . 1 978). See generally Wi l liam T. Barker, The Right and Duty to Defend: Conflicts of
Interest and Insurer Control of the Defense, 1 992 A.B.A. SEC. OF TORT S & INS. PRAC. 1 95 .
59. See, e.g. , CAL. Clv. CODE § 2 860(c) (West 1 993).
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the insured, who denied the story. When the lawyer next
talked to the two potential witnesses, they said they had
since spoken to the plaintiff's lawyer, who told them that
the plaintiff would prefer to treat the incident as an
accident and that they would not be needed as witnesses in
the case.
The Softball Case is a latent Separation Assault Case. The immediate
conflict between the insured and the company lies in the use of the
information from the potential witnesses.

The insured would prefer that
60
The company would
the company never learn about these witnesse s .
prefer to have the information in order to determine whether to make any
additional investigation and, eventually, whether to raise a coverage
defense.
Here, the plaintiff s lawyer' s statement to the witnesses (that the
plaintiff prefers to treat the case as an accident) strongly suggests that the
61
plaintiff has chosen an implicit alliance with the insured.
Either the
insured lacks collectible assets or the plaintiff has decided that it will be
easier to obtain a settlement from the company than it woul d from the
insured .

As a result, the interests in this case line up much like the

interests in the Mi srepresentation Case: the plaintiff and the insured allied
against the company in the plaintiff s choice triangle and against the
lawyer in the j ury triangle, with the goal of creating pres sure

for

settlement.
The difference is that, as in the Separation Assault, the company has an

enhanced incentive to enlist the lawyer in an alliance against the insured

and, thus, a correspondingly greater interest in preventing the lawyer from
allying with the insured and the plaintiff. At the same time, however, the

lawyer has a significant interest in withholding the information, at l east in
j urisdictions that adopt the shift in control strategy describe d above .
Providing the information increases the likelihood that the S oftball c ase
will become a Separation Assault case, with the likely result that the
insurance defense lawyer will lose the file (to an "independent" lawyer

60. The insured has this preference whether or not she "in fact" i ntended the harm.
Thus, the conflict does not depend on a fraudulent intent on the part of the insured.
6 1 . For a nuanced discussion of the "underlitigation" strategy that follows from such an
alliance, see Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for
Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L . REV. I 72 I ( 1 997).
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Once again, the self-interest of the lawyer may

mitigate the presumed tendency of the lawyer to favor the interests of the
company over the insured.

C. Shared claim risk from uncovered harm

In the third set of pattern conflict cases, the company and the insured
share the claim risk because the insured faces a kind of harm that is not

covered by the insurance policy. In the Food Poisoning Case that harm is
damage to the insured ' s reputation .

In the Punitive Damages Case that

harm is punitive damages in a jurisdiction in which such damages are
uninsurable .

1.

The Food Poisoning Case

An insured restaurant faces a food poisoning claim. The
company 's claims manager believes that the plaintiff's
case is weak on causation grounds. The restaurant owner
believes that litigation of the case would cause negative
publicity that would decrease sales. The plaintiff offers a
pre-suit settlement of the claim for an amount that is
greater than what the claims manager reasonably believes
to be the present value of the expected judgment in the
case (adjusted for the plaintiff's probability of success) but
less than what the restaurant owner reasonably believes to
be the sum of that present value plus the reputational harm
the plaintiffcan cause the restaurant.
In the Food Poisoning Case, the insured bears claim risk because there

is more at stake than a potential judgment. This case is the reverse of the
6
often discussed malpractice settlement conflict. 3 In malpractice cases,
64
insureds sometimes oppose settlement because of reputational concerns .
Here, in contrast, the insured prefers settlement because of reputational
concerns.

The conflict between the company and the insured arises from

the nature of the risk transferred by the liability insurance contract.

The

contract obligates the company "to pay those sums that the insured

62. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g. , Note, An Insurer 's Right to Settle Versus Its Duty to Defend
Nonmeritorious Medical Malpractice Claims, 1 6 J. LEGAL M ED. 545 ( 1 995).
64. See. e.g., Shuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians' Pro f ! Liab. Ins. Trust,
570 So. 2d 1 362 ( Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 990), ajf'd, 59 1 So. 2d 1 74 (Fla. 1 992).
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becomes legally obligated to pay as damages" ; it does not obligate the
company to compensate the insured for damaged reputation .
The conflict in the Food Poisoning Case is similar to the conflicts in
the preceding cases. Because the company and the insured share the claim
risk, the company has less incentive to defend and settle the case than
would a defendant without insurance .

Indeed, if we

analogize the

reputational harm at risk in the Food Poisoning Case to a j udgment in
excess of the insurance policy limits, the interests in this case l ine up much
like the interests in the Low Limits Case.

For example, the plaintiff and

insured would be allied in favor of settlement against the company in the
plaintiff s choice triangle and against the l awyer in the jury triangle .
There i s , however, an important difference between the two cases. In

the Low Limits Case, the duty to settle requires the company to evaluate
the settlement offer as if it bore all the claim risk.

In the Food P oisoning

Case, in contrast, the duty to settle does not require the company to
evaluate the settlement o ffer as if it bore all the claim risk. Requiring the
company to do so would have the effect of eliminating the "as damages"
limit and indemnifying the insured for reputational harm.
I do not mean to suggest that the company has no obligation to
consider the consequences that its actions may have for the insured, but
simply to observe that whatever obligation the company does have, it
cannot be required to pay a settlement that takes into account the full
reputational harm faced by the insured. Thus, there almost inevitably will
be a gap in such a case between what the settl ement value o f the case

would be for a solvent, uninsured defendant and what the settlement value
of the case would be to a liability insurance carrier.

As a result, if the

plaintiff demands a large settlement premium that is based on its ability to
damage the insured's reputation (and, providing the insured has assets,
what rational plaintiff would not?), the company effectively would be
relieved of the obligation to settle the case.

Another difference between the Food Poisoning Case and the Low
Limits Case relates to the nature of the claim risk borne by the insured.
The claim risk borne by the insured in the Low Limits Case i s a risk that
the company willingly would have borne had a higher premium b een paid.
What is at stake in the conflict between the company and the insured,

65. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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therefore, is simply the amount of a given type of risk that is transferred at
.
.
a given pnce. 66
In the Food Poisoning Case, in contrast, the claim risk borne by the

insured is not a risk for which coverage i s openly avail able on the
insurance market.

There is no "lost profits" endorsement available for

purchase in the liab ility insurance market.

Thus, adjusting the incentives

in this case could shift to the company a different kind of risk than i s
typical ly understood t o be transferred b y l iability insurance. Accordingly,
what is potentially at stake in the conflict between company and insured in
the Food Poisoning case is the nature of the risk against which liab i lity
7
insurance protection will be avail able. 6
In this situation, neither the company ' s indemnity obligations nor its

duty to settle would give the company an incentive to reduce the c laim risk
faced by the insured. Indeed, if there i s a realistic possibility that the risk

of reputational harm could lead the insured to decide to take over the case
and abandon coverage, the company has an incentive to increase that risk.
This creates a potential community of interest between the p lainti ff and the
company.

Although neither the company nor the plaintiff can directly

benefit from the reputational harm, each can benefit from the insured ' s
desire to avoid that consequence.

The plaintiff increases the settlement

price, and the company avoids having to defend and pay the claim.
Like the Multiple Victim Case and the Separation Assault Case, then,
the Food Poisoning Case presents an opportunity for a tacit alliance
between the company and the plaintiff. Whether the plaintiff chooses that
alliance will , of course, depend on such circumstances as the amount of
coll ectible assets held by the insured, the relationship between the value of
the likely judgment and the reputational harm in the case, and so forth.
The interests of the lawyer may provide some counterbalance to this

tacit alliance. It is in the lawyer ' s interest that the company rej ect an early
settlement offer, but that the insured not be so threatened that it takes over
8
the case from the company and replaces the lawyer. 6
Thus, it is in the
lawyer' s interest to manage the case so as to minimize the non-judgment
risk faced by the insured.

66. This is also true of the M isrepresentation Case: the disclosure of the business at
home most likely would not have caused the company to reject the appl ication, although it
may have increased the premium.
67. Thi s is also true of the Separation Assault Case and the Punitive Damages Case:
coverage is not generally openly avail able for i ntentional harm or in some jurisdictions for
punitive damages. See Baker, supra note 22.
6 8 . Once again, thi s incentive assumes an hourly fee arrangement.
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2.

The Punitive Damages Case

After leaving a bar at closing, an insured driver drove
through a red light and hit a pedestrian in a crosswalk.
The driver stopped, backed up, drove around the victim
(now lying badly injured in the street), and proceeded to
an after hours club, where he was later arrested and
charged with driving while intoxicated and leaving the
scene of an accident. The victim survived to bring a
Punitive
compensatory and punitive damages claim.
damages are not insurable in the jurisdiction.
On these facts, the victim has a c lear right to compensatory damages
69
The insured bears claim risk

and a strong claim for punitive damages .

because the company is not required to pay a punitive damages verdict.
The conflict between the insured and the company concerns the level o f
defense effort t o devote t o the case a s wel l a s the allocation o f any
settlement or verdict to these two categories of damages. 70
From the plaintiff s perspective this case is a combination o f the
Separation Assault and Softball cases on the one hand and the Low Limits
Case on the other.

If the insured does not have significant, c o llectible

assets, then the plaintiff has no financial interest in obtaining a punitive
damages judgment Uust as the plaintiff in the Softball Case appeared to
have no financial interest in proving intentional harm) .

Indeed, because

plaintiffs ' lawyers commonly believe that a large punitive damages verdict
is likely to be accompanied by a smaller compensatory damages verdict

than would be the case in the absence of the punitive damages verdict, the
plaintiff in a drunk driving case without a "deep pocket" defendant i s

69. Florida personal injury lawyers characterized a dri ving while intoxicated claim a s a
good punitive damages case, particul arly if the i nsured left the scene. See, e.g., Interview
with Insurance Defense Lawyer (name confidential), in M iam i, Fla. (May 1 7 , 1 996), quoted
in Baker, supra note 1 4.
70. See Nandorf v. CNA Ins. Co., 479 N . E. 2d 988 (Ill. I 9 8 5 ) (holding that because of
the confl ict between the insured and the company in a case involving a small claim for
compensatory damages and a large claim for pun itive damages, the insured i s entitled to an
i ndependent counsel at the company's expense); but see Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the
Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 476, 5 0 1 ( 1 996)
(asserting that a claim for uninsurable punitive damages does not create a conflict-without
considering the settlement point made in the text above or the conflict addressed in
Nandorf).

1
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S imilarly, if

the insured has no substantial assets, the plaintiff is likely to handle the
Punitive Damages Case like the Low Limits Case :

offering to settle the

case within policy limits and then pursuing a failure to settle c ase in the
72
event of a punitive damages verdict.
If the defendant has substantial other assets, however, the plaintiff s

litigation strategy will be quite different. In that event, the interests o f the

plaintiff and the company may align, much as in the Separation Assault
case .

If the company ' s limits are high enough, the best strategy for

reducing the company ' s liability and increasing the plaintiff s recovery
may well be to contain the compensatory damages by boosting the punitive

damages claim. 73

Thus, provided the insured has assets, the Punitive

Damages Case presents the same constellation of interests against the
plaintiff as the Separation Assault Case: two against one in the plaintiff s
choice triangle, the professional responsibility triangle and even the j ury
triangl e , with no one pushing for settlement in the settlement triangle.
And, in contrast to the Separation Assault Case, the insured ' s claim for

7 1 . See Baker, supra note 1 4. It is worth noting this ability to transform punitive into
compensatory damages means that a settlement premium based on the plaintiff s ability to
obtain a pun itive damages award differs from a settlement premium based on the plaintiff s
abi lity t o damage the insured's reputation because the ability t o harm the defendant' s
reputation cannot b e used t o increase a compensatory damages j udgment, whereas the
plaintiff s ability to obtain punitive damages can. See id. Thus, a settlement premium
demanded because of the plainti ff s abi lity to inflict an uninsured punitive damages
j udgment should not necessarily relieve the company of the duty to settle the case. Cf Lira
v. Shelter Ins. Co., 9 1 3 P.2d 5 1 4 (Colo. 1 996) (maj ority and dissent review case law on
duty to settle a punitive damages claim).
72. See Baker, supra note 1 4 (reporting that defense lawyers analogized punitive
damages cases to low limits cases for duty-to-settle purposes).
73. This strategy seems most likely to be fruitful in j urisdictions in which the duty to
settle does not obligate the company to protect the insured from a punitive damages verdict.
See, e.g. , Lira, 9 1 3 P.2d at 5 1 6 ("[a]n insurer who has not contracted to insure against its
insured's l iability for punitive damges has no duty to settle the compensatory part of the
claim to minimize the insured's exposure to punitive damages"). In such a j urisdiction, a
company that has rejected a policy l imits settlement offer would have great incentive to have
the jury release its anger on the punitive damages line on the verdict form, not the
compensatory damages line. Other jurisdictions appear to require the company to provide at
least some protection against a punitive damages verdict. See Magnum Foods, Inc. v.
Continental Cas. Co., 36 F.3d 1 49 1 , 1 506 ( l Oth Cir 1 994) ("the good faith duty thus
requires cooperative efforts by [company] with [insured] throughout to handle and settle the
entire case"). I n my view, the former approach wrongly ignores the fact that punitive
damages can be "transformed" into compensatory damages. See Baker, supra note 1 4.
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control

over the

insurance defense

lawyer is

quite weak.

Indeed,

C alifornia ' s "Cumis" statute explicitly states that a claim for pumtlve
damages does not entitle the insured to a company-funded independent
74
defense l awyer.
III . THE D UTY TO D E FEND WH O M AGAINST W HAT ?
As

the

preceding

discussion

has

i llustrated,

triangularity

multifaceted feature of the liability insurance relationship .
courts

and

professional

respons ibility

specialists

worry

is

a

Typ ically,
about

that

triangularity because the insurance defense lawyer' s financial interests are

so closely tied to the company that the lawyer seems destined to become
7
the company' s instrument for shifting risk to the insured. 5 Factoring the
plaintiff into the relationship complicates that worry. On the one hand, the
concern that the lawyer will sacri fice the insured is increased by potential
alliances between plaintiff and company, as illustrated most c learly by the
S eparation Assault Case and the Punitive Damages

Case

and

also,

potentially, by the Multiple Victim Case and the Food Poisoning Case. On
the other hand, the potential alliance between plaintiff and insured raises
concerns about the lawyer shifting risk to the company, as seems likely in
the Softball Case and at least possible in the Low Limits Case and the
Misrepresentation Case.
Complicating the question "who i s taking advantage of whom" does
not change the existence of the conflict between the company and the
insured, nor the need to decide the scope of representation that the duty to
defend requires .

Insurance law plainly does not require the company to

engage a lawyer to represent all the interests of the insured potentially at
issue in a claim. For example, the company would not be required to retain
a lawyer to defend the insured in a criminal proceeding arising out of the

Separation Assault, even though the outcome could have obvious relevance
76
Nor, in either the
both to the value of, and insurance for, the claim.

74. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 2 860 (West 1 993). In Nandorf, 479 N . E.2d at 9 8 8 , the
I l linois court pennitted the insured to hire independent counsel at the compan y ' s expense,
but the facts in that case were quite exceptional. In the underlying claim at i ssue in
Nandorf, only nominal compensatory damages were sought, with the result that the whole
case was really about punitive damages. In that special case, the court held that the
company cannot be counted upon to provide a defense that is adequate to the risk at stake.
7 5 . See, e.g. , CHI of Alaska v. Employers Reinsurance Corp . , 844 P.2d 1 1 1 3 , 1 1 1 6
(Alaska 1 993) and sources cited therein.
76. See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 292.
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Separation Assault Case or the Mi srepresentation Case would the company
be required to engage a lawyer to represent the insured in any related
77
insurance coverage litigation.
The chall enge is to define the scope of the
defense lawyer ' s representation of the insured in a manner that provides

meaningful guidance to the real people who navigate through the l iability
insurance tetrahedron.

A. A Judgment Risk Approach to the Duty to Defend
In "The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers,"
Professor Charles Silver and Dean Kent Syverud considered the scope o f
the insurance defense lawyer' s representation of the insured i n the context
7
of what they call the full coverage case. 8 By a "full coverage" case they
mean a case in which the limits of the insurance policy exceed the damages

sought by the plaintiff and in which the company has no present basis for
expressing any doubt about the obligation to indemnify the insured against
79
In such a case, they conclude that the duty to defend

those damages.

obligates the company to retain a lawyer to conduct a defense that
minimizes the size and probability of a plaintiff s j udgment in the case and,
0
consistent with that primary goal, minimizes the costs of defense . 8 Thus,
with respect to the insured--who does not bear the costs of defense-the
scope of the lawyer' s representation is the minimization of the size and
probab ility of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. For this reason, I refer
to Silver and Svyerud ' s approach as a "j udgment risk" approach to the duty
to defend.

In the paragraphs that follow, I use the pattern cases and the concept o f

claim risk and its components t o extend this judgment risk approach

beyond the full coverage situations Silver and Syverud considered .

This

extension is possible because the company and the insured can share the

c laim risk even in a "full coverage" case of the sort that Silver and Syverud

7 7 . I f the insured is successful in that insurance coverage l itigation, the company may
well have to pay the i nsured's legal fees, but the insured bears those fees in the first
instance. See Baker, supra note I 0 at 1 424.
78. See S ilver & Syverud, supra note 5 .
7 9 . See id. at 263 .
80. The most direct statement Si lver and Syverud make on thi s point i s that the
company has a duty "to provide a lawyer to defend the insured." !d. at 3 00-0 I . N owhere
do they succinctly define what they mean by "defend the i nsured," but a careful reading of
their analysis leads me to the judgment risk description. See, e.g. , id. at 3 29-3 1 (discussing
scope of lawyer's representation in a case in which there is a confl ict between the insured's
reputati onal interest and the company's i nterest i n m inimizing the cost of the claim).
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addressed. This risk sharing can occur for one of two reason s : either the

c laim has consequences for the insured beyond a potential plaintiff s

j udgment (as in the Food Poisoning Case) or there i s the potential for the
company later to learn of circumstances that would lead it to express
uncertainty about its obligation to pay the claim (as in the S oftball case) .
These two types of cases--both of which Silver and Syverud considered
present all the essential elements of shared claim risk that occur in the
other pattern cases.

Indeed, the S oftball Case presents most of these e lements.

These

elements can be illustrated by thinking of the insured's claim risk in the
Softball Case as the product of the fol lowing six factors:

(1)

the

probability

that

the

company

learn s

of

information suggesting that t h e insured intended t h e harm,

(2) the probability that this

information would lead the

company to reserve its right to litigate coverage for the
claim,

(3)

the probability that the company would not settl e

(4)

the probability o f a plaintiff s verdict should the

(5)

the probability that the insured would lose a

the claim,
company not settle,
subsequent coverage case, and

(6) the dollar amount of the likely plaintiff s verdict in

the liability case.
The "judgment risk" portion of this equation is the product of factors

(4) and (6) :

the probability of a plaintiff s verdict multiplied by the likely

dollar amount o f that verdict.

The portion of that judgment risk borne by the insured is a function o f

the remaining factors i n the equation. Factors

(1 ), (2),

and

(5)

are all part

of what I refer to as the "coverage risk" component of the claim risk, and
factor

(3)

is what I call the "settlement risk" component.

In S ilver and

Syverud's analysis, both of these components lie outside the scope of the
defense lawyer' s representation o f the insured.

81

Thus, we might say that,

8 1 . See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 343 -48 (stating that the lawyer has an
obligation to turn over all information relevant to the defense of the case, even if harmful to
the insured' s coverage case), at 296-99 (stating that the company i s not required to retain
the lawyer to represent the insured with respect to settlement), and at 2 9 3 (stating their

l

1

l
j

I

1

11' • .
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under a judgment risk approach to the duty to defend, the lawyer represents
the insured for the purpose of minimizing the total judgment risk in the
case, but not for the purpose of reducing the insured ' s share of that risk.

Silver and Syverud did not directly address limited coverage cases .

Nevertheless, the claim risk faced b y insureds in limited coverage cases i s
essentially the same a s the claim risk presented i n a latent limited coverage
case like the Softball Case.

In the Separation Assault Case and the Misrepresentation Case, the

(3) through (6) from the
the judgment risk (factors (4) and (6)), the settlement

insured ' s claim risk is the product of factors
Softball Case above:

risk (factor

(3)),

and the risk that a court will determine that the c laim is

not covered (factor

(5)). In the Low Limits Case and the Punitive Damages

Case, the insured ' s claim risk is the product of four similar factors :
(a) the probability that the company will not settle the
case,
(b) the probability of an excess or punitive damages
verdict if the company does not settle,
(c) the probability of losing a subsequent failure to
settle case, and
(d) the size of the excess or punitive damages verdict
that the insured would have to pay as a result.
Factors (b) and (d) from this list are part of the j udgment risk;

factor

(a) is the same as the settlement risk present in the preceding cases; and
factor (c) is a form of coverage risk. As in the Softball Case, the j udgment

"preliminary conclusion" that the lawyer does not represent the insured with respect to
coverage and should not provide coverage advice).
As Silver & Syverud are careful to make clear, deciding that these factors lie outside
the scope of the defense lawyer's representation woul d not mean that the lawyer would have
no professional responsibilities with respect to those factors. For example, if the i nsured
directed the defense lawyer not to supply the information in the Softball Case to the
company, Si lver & Syverud would agree that the lawyer could not do so. Under the canons
of professional responsibility, a lawyer has a duty of loyalty to the cli ent that precludes
disobeying instructions. The proper course for the lawyer under Si lver & Syverud ' s
approach would b e to inform the insured that the lawyer' s duty o f loyalty t o the company
requires the lawyer to provide the information to the company, unless the i n sured instructs
the lawyer to the contrary, and that, if the insured did instruct the lawyer to the contrary, the
duty of loyalty to the company would require the lawyer to withdraw from the case. See id.
at 3 59-6 1 .
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risk approach would assign the lawyer to represent the insured with respect
to the judgment risk, but not the settlement or coverage risk.

In the Food Poisoning Case (and in the analogous case addressed by
2
S ilver and Syverud 8 ) , the damages sought by the plaintiff are well within

the limits of the policy, and there i s no doubt that the claim i s covered by
the policy. As a result, the insured does not bear any judgment risk.

All

the risk the insured bears is non-j udgment risk, and under a judgment risk

approach to the duty to defend, the company would have no obligation to
83
retain the defense lawyer to represent the insured with respect to that risk.

Looking at these pattern cases together, we can see that the judgment

risk approach to the duty to defend leaves the insured on its own with
respect to three kinds of claim risk:

settlement risk, coverage risk, and a

catch-all category I call ,.'non-judgment risk" that is illustrated by the
reputational risk in the Food Poisoning case.
If we understand the company ' s duty to defend as derived from the
84
duty to indemnify, then excluding both the coverage risk and the other
non-judgment risk from the scope of the lawyer' s representation makes
good intuitive sense.

(I will address settlement risk in a separate section

below.) The duty to defend does not encompass coverage risk because, by
definition, the company has no duty to indemnify a non-covered claim.
Similarly, the duty to defend does not encompass non-judgment risk
because the insurance policy limits the company ' s indemnity obligation to
"pay those sums the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages," which
does not include collateral harm to the insured (as opposed to a third party)

resulting from a claim. Thus, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to

indemnify, but the duty to defend is broader only in the sense that the

82. In Silver & Syverud's hypothetical the insured is concerned that litigation of the
case would reveal h i s marital infidel ity. See id. at 327.
83. See id. at 327-3 1 .
84. This i s the way standard l iability i nsurance policies define the duty. See supra n ote
I I ("We will pay those sums that the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages . . . We
will have the right and duty to defend any suit seeking those damages."). It is also the way
that courts describe the duty to defend. See, e.g., Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 2 6 7 A.2d 7
(N .J. 1 970) ("[t)he sense of the covenant i s to defend c laims which the carrier would be
required to pay i f the claimant prevailed in the action. . . . The obligation to defend
' groundless, false or fraudulent' clai ms does not mean that the carrier will defend c laims
which would be beyond the covenant to pay i f the carrier prevailed"); Gray v. Zurich, 4 1 9
P.2d 1 68 , 1 76 (Cal . 1 966) ("[a]n insurer, therefore, bears a duty to defend i ts i nsured
whenever it ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of l iabil ity [i.e., an obl igation to
i ndemnify the insured] under the po licy").
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company must defend the case as if there were no doubt about coverage,
8
unle ss and until non-coverage is conclusively proven. 5

B. Defense Lawyers and Settlement Risk
As I have just described, excluding coverage risk and other non
judgement risk from the scope of the defense lawyer' s representation of the
insured can be justified by reference to limits on the duty to indemnify and
the derivative nature of the duty to defend.

That j ustification cannot be

used to exclude settlement risk from the scope of representation.

Indeed,

the company ' s duty to settle exists precisely because the company ' s duty

to indemnify is limited.

If the company' s duty to indemnify were

unlimited, the insured would face no risk from the company' s failure to
settle and, thus, there would be no need for a duty to settle. Accordingly,
limits on the duty to indemnify provide no logical basis for concluding that
settlement lies outside the scope of the duty to indemnify or its derivative,

the duty to defend.

Moreover, it is historical happenstance that the duty to settle evolved

out of the duty to indemnify.

The duty to settle can also be seen as an

extension of the duty to defend.

After all, what better way is there to

minimize the judgment risk than to settle the case?

Furthermore, because

settlements are also a means of avoiding defense costs, it is not hard to
6

erode the defense - settlement distinction. 8

This does not mean, however, that the scope of the defense lawyer' s

representation of the insured should include settlement.

In the ordinary

85. There i s a useful symmetry between the proposition that the duty to defend requires
the company to defend the c laim "as if there were full coverage" for any resulting j udgment
and the proposition that the duty to settle requires the company to evaluate settlements "as if
there were no limits" on the dollar amount of coverage. Both propositions simplify, in a
helpful way, some of the complexities of the liability insurance relationship. Both, at least
in theory, help contain the conflict between company and insured. And both are l ikely i n
fact t o provide significant protection t o the insured, because both also benefit another party
to the l iabil ity insurance relationship. The plaintiff stands to benefit from the duty to settle
and, for that reason, has an incentive to construct its case in a manner that protects the
insured's right to a settlement within limits. The defense lawyer stands to benefit from the
requirement that the company defend the case "as if' it were fully covered and, thus, has an
incentive to defend the case in that manner.
86. This may explain why there are, at least to my knowledge, no l iabili ty i nsurance
policies that provide only defense coverage. For an argument that there should be such
liabi lity insurance defense-only policies, see Alan Widiss, Abrogating the Right and Duty of
Liability Insurers to Defend Their Insureds: The Case for Separating the Obligation to
Indemnify from the Defense of Insureds, 5 1 OHIO L.J. 9 1 7 ( 1 990).
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case it is the company that control s settlement and, therefore, an insured
87 As a result,
wishing to settle a case must convince the company to do so.
including settlement in the scope of the lawyer ' s representation of the
insured is problematic from the perspective of preserving the "triangular

relationship [between insured, lawyer and company] in its normal state." 8 8

If t h e defense lawyer represents the insured with respect to settlement, the
defense lawyer would become the insured ' s advocate to the c o mpany.

In

that setting, it is very difficult to think of the insured and the company on
an equal footing in a "normal" triangular relationship. Instead, the insured
89
would be the lawyer ' s "friend" and the company, the l awyer ' s "enemy" .
Thus, one reason to exclude settlement from the scope o f the defense
lawyer' s representation of the insured is to minimize the frequency of overt
conflicts in the professional responsibility triangle.

Indeed, because an

insured almost always would prefer a settlement, even when the insured
bears essentially no claim risk, including settlement within the scope o f
representation of the insured would seem t o make client conflicts t h e usual,
rather than the exceptional, lot of the insurance defense lawyer.
Ultimately, however, this reason is unsatisfactory because the lawyer' s
responsibilities in the face of the conflict can easily be addressed by
directing the lawyer to privilege one or the other client in settlement
conflict situations.

Indeed, in practice this appears to be exactly what

happens. Insurance defense lawyers typically represent the company, and
90
not the insured, with respect to settlement.
Including settlement in the
scope of the lawyer' s representation of the insured would simply reverse

that situation, so that the insurance defense lawyer would represent the

insured, not the company, with respect to settlement. In that event, we can
expect a rational insurance company either to retain a second lawyer to

87. The qualification in this sentence reflects the fact that in disputed coverage
situations insurance law may permit the insureds to settle directly with claimants and then
litigate coverage with the company. See. e.g., Thornton v. Paul, 3 84 N.E.2d 3 3 5 ( I l l . 1 978).
8 8 . Hazard, supra note I , at 3 8 .
89. See id. a t 2 1 (citing Charles Fried, The Lawyer a s Friend: The Moral Foundations
of the Lawyer-Clien t Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. I 060 ( 1 976)).
90. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 295. Cf Keeton, supra note 3, at 1 1 68-7 1
(arguing that thi s arrangement is proper). The defense lawyers interviewed in connection
with my punitive damages study, see Baker, supra note 1 4, confirmed this practice. The
exception to the general rule occurs not when the i nsurance defense lawyer represents the
insured with respect to settlement, but rather when the lawyer does not handle settlement for
either client- because an adj uster or company counsel (who does not represent the insured
for any purpose) is handling the settlement.

INSURANCE CONFLICTS AND DEFENSE LA WYERS

1 997 ]

141

handle the settlement or to expand the duties o f the claims adj uster to
include settlement.

handling claims.

Both seem likely to increase the company ' s cost o f

The question i s whether this extra cost would b e so

clearly outweighed by benefits to insureds that legal intervention to change
the current practice appears justified.

For defendants with significant assets to protect, including settlement

within the scope of the insurance defense lawyer' s representation of the
insured would seem to provide very l ittle benefit. For the reasons explored

in Part II, a defendant with significant assets to protect in a shared claim

risk situation is unlikely to conclude that a lawyer selected and controlled
by the company would be sufficiently loyal to serve as the insured ' s sole
representative

for

settlement

purposes.

As

the

l iability

insurance

tetrahedron makes clear, in a shared claim risk situation there are simply
too many opportunities for the interests of the company and the plaintiff to
intersect for a wise insured with assets to protect not to seek personal
counse l . Once the insured retains personal counsel, there is l ittle need for
the

insurance

defense

counsel to

serve

as

the

insured ' s

settlement

advocate.
Defendants with few or no assets to protect have little need for
91

settlement representation and, thus, l ittle reason to pay extra to obtain it.

Indeed, it is the plaintiff, not the judgment proof (or near-j udgment proof)
92
For defendants without
defendant who bears the real settlement risk.
significant assets, the best protection against all aspects of the c laim risk is

the plaintiff s interest in constructing the case so that the company wil l
settle a s favorably a s possible.

The "unsophisticated" insured with personal assets to protect presents

the most difficult case, because that insured may not easily appreciate the
need to obtain independent advice about settlement.

In my view,

obligating the lawyer to make sure that that insured in fact comes to
9
appreciate that need 3 provides better protection than a rule that requires

9 1 . Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that most i ndividual i nsureds feel little need
to pay extra for less settlement risk is the prevalence of l ow limit insurance policies.
92. See, e.g., Steele v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 44 1 (7th Cir. 1 986) (Posner, J.).
9 3 . Si lver and Syverud ground that obligation in professional responsibility law. See
Silver & Syverud, supra note 5 at, 3 1 1 - 1 3 (grounding obligation to inform client i n the duty
of loyalty). I woul d also ground it in insurance law. See, e.g. , Myers v. Ambassador Ins.
Co., 508 A.2d 684 ( Vt. 1 9 86) (ob l igating i nsurance company to advise insured of the
existence of a conflict of interest so the insured can determine whether to retain personal
counsel); see also Steele v. The Hartford Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 44 1 (7th Cir. 1 9 86) (ill ustrating
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94
the lawyer to act on the insured ' s behalf against the lawyer' s interests.
Fulfilling that obligation is likely to require the lawyer to provide the

insured much of the same information that a lawyer representing the
insured for settlement purposes would provide, but with the additional
disclosure

that

the

lawyer

is

prohibited

from

undertaking

that

representation because of the conflict between the company and the
lawyer.

Moreover, all insureds benefit from the common practice of the

company using the insurance defense lawyer to handle the settlement on
behalf of the company. Under the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the
company has the obligation to consider the interests of the insured in all
aspects of the claim, including settlement. This obligation i s implemented

not by an abstract entity, but rather by real people who have limited access
to information and competing demands on their time.

Of all the people

available to handle settlement on behalf of the company, the insurance
defense lawyer is the person most likely to know and understand the
situation of the insured and, therefore, best abl e to take into account the
insure d ' s interests . If insurance or professional responsibil ity law were to
obligate the insurance defense lawyer to represent the insured for purposes
of settlement, the real people to whom companies wi ll assign settlement
responsib ilities will be company counsels and adj usters. Neither company
counsel nor an adj uster will know and understand the insured ' s situation as
wel l as the insurance defense lawyer.

Thus, the higher liab ility insurance

premiums that would likely result from requiring the lawyer to represent
the insured for purposes of settlement seem unlikely in practice to purchase
additional protection for insureds.

the extent of measures insurance defense lawyers are expected to undertake to ensure that
individual insureds understand the nature of conflicts of interest).
94. The "lawyer' s interests" I am referring to here are not simply the i nterest i n
obtaining more fees from avoiding a settlement, b u t also the interest in obtai n ing additional
business from the company by favoring the company over the insured in the context of
settlement. The clearest examples of cases in which the conflict between company and
insured would make it difficult for the lawyer to be the insured ' s loyal settlement advocate
are those in which the interests of the company and the p laintiff potentially overlap: the
Separation Assault, Food Poisoning, and Punitive Damages cases. Even in cases in which
the interests of company and plaintiff do not overlap, however (the Low Limits,
Misrepresentation, and Softball cases), there are many scenarios in which resisting
settlement would be in the company ' s interest.

\1
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C. Conflicts in the Judgement Risk Approach
The judgment risk approach holds out the potential for preserving the
triangular relationship between the lawyer, the insured and the company in
its normal state.

The judgment risk approach would do this, not by

eliminating the conflict between the company and the insured, but rather
by removing the lawyer from the middle of that conflict and thereby
eliminating the lawyer ' s choice between company and insured .

In t h e Misrepresentation Case, and only i n that case, the j udgment risk

approach realizes most of that goal .

In the Misrepresentation Case, the

conflict between the company and the insured relates only to the coverage

for the claim and the related e ffect that uncertainty over coverage has on
the company ' s commitment to the defense and settlement of the c laim. By
making c lear that the scope of the lawyer' s representation of the insured
includes neither coverage nor settlement risk, the judgment risk approach
takes the lawyer out of the middle of those two conflicts.
The lawyer does remain in the middle of the conflict over the amount

of effort to devote to the defense of the case, but the j udgment risk
approach contains that conflict by reducing the company' s ability to shirk
in the defense . The judgment risk approach charges the company�and by
extension the lawyer�with the responsibility of defending the claim as if
9
there were no coverage dispute . 5 Opposing company efforts to shirk in
the defense is in the lawyer' s self-interest, and, because the lawyer' s
participation i n such shirking would b e grounds for a malpractice claim,

the judgment risk approach empowers the lawyer to resist company e fforts
to shirk.

·

In all the other pattern conflict cases, the judgment ri sk approach

leaves the lawyer firmly embedded in the conflict between company and
insured.

In each of these other cases, the company has an opportunity to

manage the defense lawyer ' s representation of the insured in a way that

shifts claim risk to the insured . In the Low Limits Case, the company can

manage the defense so as to make it more difficult for the insured to l ater

9 5 . A court surely would imply in the retainer agreement between the company, lawyer
and i nsured those requirements from the liabi lity insurance contract that benefit the insured.
The company has actual notice of such requirements, the lawyer has constructive notice,
and the insured has a reasonable expectation that a retainer agreement formed i n an effort to
fulfi l l the requirements of the liabi lity insurance contract will not reduce the insured ' s rights
under that contract.
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prove that the case could have been settled within the policy limits . In the
Multiple Victim Case, the company can direct the lawyer to represent the
insured only with respect to the first claim, pay that claim and terminate
the representation .

In the Separation Assault Case and the Softball Case,

the company can use the defense to gather information helpful to the
coverage case and, absent a shift in control , even to shape the outcome of
96
the liability case to its benefit.
In the Food Poisoning Case, the company
can instruct the lawyer to handle the case in a manner that exacerbates the
potential reputational harm, thus increasing the likelihood that the insured
settles at its own expense to avoid that harm. And in the Punitive Damages
Case, the company can instruct the lawyer to handle the case in a manner
that exacerbates the risk of punitive damages.

All this is review from Part II above. The significant point here i s that

the judgment risk approach to the duty to defend does not eliminate the
"lawyer' s choice" in these other pattern cases.

Thus, unless the law

constrains that choice, it seems likely to be governed solely by the interests
I explored using the metaphor of the liability insurance tetrahedron.
S i lver and Syverud unapologetically would constrain that choice in
favor of obligating the lawyer to protect the company ' s
minimizing the judgment risk.

interest in

Thus, in the Softball Case they would

obligate the lawyer to inform the company of the information that may
97
threaten the insured ' s coverage.
And in the Food Poisoning Case they
would obligate the lawyer to withdraw from the case once there is a
concrete action that implicates the conflict, unless the insured agrees to

sacrifice its reputational interest in favor of reducing the company ' s claim
98
By extension, they would require the lawyer to follow the
ri sk.
company' s instructions regarding the handling of the insured ' s defense in

the

Low

Limits,

Multiple

Victim,

S eparation

Assault

and

Punitive

96. For example, if the p laintiff includes both a negligence and an intentional tort count
in the complaint, the company could manage the defense in a way that made if more l ikely
that the l iabi l ity case would result in an outcome that would be more helpful to the c ompany
in avoiding coverage. The company could do this by, for example, instructing the defense
lawyer to request a special verdict form rather than a general verdict form. Th is could assist
the company in avoid coverage because a special verdict form would ask the jury to
consider the negligence and intentional tort counts separately. If the j ury finds the
defendent l iable under the intentional tort, the company may not have to pay the claim
(depending on the collateral estoppel rules of the jurisdiction and the particular facts of the
case). I f the jury answers a general verdict, there w i l l be no finding of intent.
97. See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 343-48.
9 8 . See id. at 328.
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Damages cases, even when those instructions would further the company ' s
99
intere sts against the insured i n a later failure to settle or coverage case.
This does not mean that S i lver and Syverud would obligate the lawyer
in

fact

to carry out such instructions.

Under the norms of professional

resp onsibility they describe, the l awyer would have a duty of loyalty to the

insured that would require the l awyer to explain the existence of a conflict
and to obey contrary instructions of the insured.

In the face o f such

contrary instructions, the lawyer would not be obligated in

fact

to c arry out

either the instruction of the company or the instruction of the insured, but
1 00
If the insured
rather would be obligated to withdraw from the case .

continued to i ssue the same instructions to the replacement defense lawyer,

that lawyer would also be required to withdraw, as would the next lawyer,
and so on .
1 01
defense.

The result would be that the insured would not rec eive a
Thus, Silver and Syverud would allow the company to

condition the provision of a defense on the insured agreeing to allow the
defense l awyer to favor the company' s interests over the insured ' s .

Nevertheless, I d o not read Silver and S yverud a s saying that the

company can "do no wrong" in the handling of these cases. Indeed, I have
no doubt that they would condemn a company that crudely profited at the
insured ' s expense. Their approach simply takes away from the lawyer the
need to decide whether the lawyer is obligated to honor any particular

instruction from the company and leaves the policing of the company ' s
conduct t o a subsequent bad faith suit between the company and the
insured.

This approach has the great benefit of simplicity and predictability. It

gives the defense lawyer a clear obj ective: reducing the judgment risk.

It

prohibits the lawyer from allying with either the insured or the plaintiff

99. I should be c lear that they do not reach these issues and, thus, may disagree. It i s
possible that they would conclude in the Separation Assault Case that, in juri sdictions where
there i s no shift in control , the conflict between the insured and the company i s so acute
that, as a matter of professional responsibility law, the lawyer may not represent both
company and insured. Once the lawyer represents only the insured, the duty of loyalty upon
which they base the lawyer's obligation to provide the information to the company would
no longer apply.
I OO. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 5 , at 359.
I 0 I . If the instruction relates to information (as in a Softball-type case), a particular
conflict may be resolved in a contrary manner, because the new lawyer may not receive that
information. For example, if the first defense lawyer withdraws in the Softball case, the
second lawyer may not learn about the first lawyer' s conversati ons with the potential
witnesses.
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It reduces the likelihood that the insured wil l p lace

mistaken trust in the lawyer and the company.

And, provided the lawyer

fully discloses the limited scope of the representation, it encourages the

insured to retain a separate lawyer whose loyalty wil l be unconfl icted.
While this approach may seem to disadvantage an insured without
substantial assets, that insured wil l receive at least some protection from
the plaintiff, who has the greatest interest in structuring the case to
maximize the company ' s claim risk.

D. Leavening the Judgement Risk Approach
From an insurance law perspective, however,

Si lver and Syverud ' s

approach (at least as I have understood and extended it) goe s too far i n
limiting the duty t o defend.

T h e core problem is that their approach

obl igates the person most immediately in charge of the defense-the
defense

lawyer-to

harm the

insured,

either

by

providing

harmful

information to the company or by defending the case in a manner intended
to advantage the company over the insured in a subsequent or pending
dispute. Granted, this wil l only happen in a limited set of circumstances,
and in some of those circumstance the insured may even "deserve" the
harm.

Indeed, in many cases the insured will either have chosen to buy an
1 02
insurance policy with an absurdly low limit
or wil l have committed a
senous wrong.
Nevertheless, insurance law requires insurance companies to give

"equal consideration" to the interests of insureds in handling liability
103
c laims .
Thus, even though the source of the shared claim risk may be

I 02. My current favorite examples are obstetricians and cardiac surgeons with
$2 50,000 mal practice policies (a common practice in South Florida). I doubt m any of these
doctors have l i abi l i ty l imits this low in their automobile or homeowners' insurance polic ies.
1 03 . See, e.g., Coleman v. Holecek, 542 F.2d 532, 537 ( l Oth Cir. 1 9 76) (explaining the
equal consideration principle in the duty to settle context in which it origi nated). As the
Coleman court recognized, the equal consi deration principle applies when the com pany has
control over deci sions in which there is a confl i ct between company and insured. As that
broad description of the principle suggests, it applies to the duty to defend as wel l. See,
e.g. , Bennett v. Conrady, 305 P.2d 823 ( Kan. 1 957) ("[b] ecause of poss ible confl icts of
interest between an insurance company and its insured in the defense or settl ement of claims
against the insured there is a mutual fiduc iary relationship whereby each owes the other the
duty to exercise reasonable care in conducting such defense or settlement"). Indeed, the
Washi ngton Supreme Court has stated that the company ' s duty goes beyond equal
consi deration when defending a case under a reservation of rights. See Tank v. Public
Employees M ut. Ins. Co., 7 1 5 P.2d 1 1 33 , 1 1 3 7 ( Wash. 1 9 86) ("the potential conflict of

1 9 97]
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the insured ' s negligence in purchasing insurance (the Low Limits and
Multiple Victim cases), or a strong likelihood that the insured acted with
sufficient culpability to satisfy either the intentional harm exclusion or the
standard for punitive damages (the Separation Assault,

Softball and

Punitive Damages Cases), the company nevertheless may not manage the
defense of the claim in a way that exploits the risk faced by the insured to

reduce the risk faced by the company.

Retaining a defense lawyer on terms that require the lawyer to betray

the insured when the company so requests is unlikely to be seen as
con sistent with the equal consideration principl e . As I have explored
elsewhere, betrayal is a potent theme in insurance law discourse that
10
insureds have often used to constrain insurance company behavior. 4 The
fact that, under norms of professional responsibility law, the lawyer may

not be obligated in fact to carry out those instructions if the insured
10
obj ects, 5 does not insulate the company from the insure d ' s complaint. It
will remain the case that the insured will be required to choose between

betrayal and a defense.
That choice is hardly consistent with the insurance law vision of the
1 06
Indeed, it takes very little
insurance company as the insured ' s protector.
imagination to see that the Silver and Syverud approach would transform

the

lawyer in the

company ' s sword.

Softball case from the insured ' s

shield

into

the

That is how I see it, and, while I acknowledge that

shields and swords, like triangles and tetrahedrons, are only metaphors and
that there may be other ways of understanding that situation, I predict this
is also how judges will see it.

Thus, although I conclude with Silver and Syverud that a company can

fulfill its duty to defend by retaining a lawyer to minimize the j udgment
risk associated with the claim (and therefore that a company has no

interests between an insurer and insured inherent in this type of defense mandates an even
higher standard").
I 04. See Baker, supra note I 0, at 1 3 95-96, 1 4 1 8-20, 1 423.
I 05. See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 3 5 1 .
I 06. See Baker, supra note I 0, at 1 403-07, 1 4 1 9-20. A recent pri nt advertisement for a
new form of directors and officers liability insurance portrays this vision in striking terms.
The advertisement consists of a large photo of a pair of well worn business shoes, over the
capti on: "The First D&O Coverage With "Duty To Defend" For Public Companies. It Puts
Carriers Where They Belong." Bus. INS., Jan. 1 3 , 1 997, at 40; N AT L UNDERWRITER P ROP .
& CAS./RISK & BEN E F IT S MGMT. ED., May 1 9, 1 997, at 22. A company that hires a defense
lawyer on terms that require the lawyer to betray the i nsured is hardly standing in the shoes
of the insured.
'
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obligation to retain a lawyer to represent the insured with respect to

coverage, settlement or other non-judgment risk), I also conclude that the
duty to defend requires the company to retain the lawyer to represent the
insured first in a conflict situation.

Thi s "primary client" rule arises from

the company' s duty of good faith, as expressed by the equal consideration
principle and by cases requiring the insurance company to give up control
over the defense when the conflict between the company and the insured i s
severe.

B ecause the duty to defend is implied (whether "in fact" or "in law")

in the retainer agreement, the lawyer is so obligated whether the company
1 07
For example, the lawyer should
explicitly instructs the lawyer or not.
not provide information to the company that increases the uncertainty o f
insurance coverage for the claim, the lawyer should not conduct the

defense in a manner that unnecessarily harms the reputation of the
10
insured, 8 and the lawyer should not refrain from providing h i s or her best
j udgment about the value of the l iability case to the company and the
insured.
Like the duty to evaluate settlement possibilities as if there were no
dollar limits in the insurance policy, and like the duty to defend as i f there
were no doubts about coverage for the claim, the duty to retain the lawyer
to represent the insured first in a conflict situation should provide real
protection to insureds because that duty benefits other particip ants in the
liability insurance relationship . The duty to represent the insured first in a

conflict situation benefits the defense lawyer by reducing the likelihood o f
t h e lawyer being conflicted out of a case and b y c larifying t h e lawyer ' s
obligations in a way that reduces the likelihood that the insured will fee l

betrayed b y the lawyer. The duty also benefits the plaintiff b y providing a
I 07. Si lver & Syverud conclude that under established norms o f professional
responsibility the liabi lity insurance contract "bleeds into" the retainer agreement. See
Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 27 1 . I agree, though I would like to register a small
contracts teacher ' s complaint. Contracts do not "bleed" into one another. I nstead, terms
from one contract are, in the appropriate c ircumstance, implied (in fact or in law) into
another because of a course of dealing, trade practice or other appropriate reason.
I 08. I recognize the fai lure of analytical imagination that requires the use of the word
"unnecessari ly" in this situation. The harm that this standard is seeking to prevent is that of
the company exploiting the insured ' s vulnerabi l ity in order to spend l ess money on a claim
than it would if the insured did not have that vulnerability. The lawyer presented with an
instruction from the company that has the potential to cause significant harm to the
insure d ' s reputation (or other non-judgment stake) is best served by drawing that potential
to the attention of the insured, so that the insured will retain independent counsel to
negotiate with the company over the direction of the defense.
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potential avenue for relief in the event of a verdict in excess of the policy
limits or outside the policy. In other words, the obl igation to regard the
insured as the primary client is an obl igation lawyers likely will fulfill,

both because it i s in their long term interest to do so and because plaintiffs
(more accurately, plaintiffs ' lawyers) are in a position to discover and act
upon breaches of that obligation that result in harm to insureds.

It is important to emphasize, however, that the practical effect o f my

"primary client" approach would differ only slightly from that of the "non
subordination" approach of Silver and Syverud. In a limited set of conflict
situations, a primary cl ient rule would require the lawyer to ignore an
insurance company instruction, where a non-subordination rul e would
require the lawyer to ask the insured to waive the conflict and to withdraw
if the insured refuses.

Regardless which of us turns out to be "right" (in

the sense of best predicting what courts will decide), the most significant
service the defense lawyer provides an insured in conflict situations is one

that we seem to agree about.

That service consists of a direct statement

that a conflict exists, a clear explanation of the dec isions that the insured

needs to make as a result of the conflict, and forceful advice that the
insured retain a personal lawyer to assist in making those decisions.

This

advice matters most in connection with settlement, where personal counsel
can advise the insured whether to limit the potential loss by first settling
the case and then disputing coverage .

C ONCLUS ION
In concluding, I want to emphasize that this article reflects a positive ,
not a normative, analysis of the duty to defend .

I have described the

liability insurance relationship and insurance law as I see them.

As the

liability insurance tetrahedron helps to demonstrate, there are tradeoffs in
any definition of the scope of the duty to defend .

It is my judgment that

the equal consideration principle of insurance law requires the company to

provide the insured a space in the relationship with the insurance defense
l awyer in which the insured ' s interests are primary. But I am not prepared

to claim that granting the insured that space will always make the world a
better place.
If we intend to ground tort law in deterrence-and much of the recent
academic writing and many judic ial opinions assert that is the case-then
we should be concerned that insureds can and will use that space to
cooperate tac itly with plaintiffs and induce companies to pay claims that,
from a pure deterrence perspective, companies perhaps should not pay.

My view, however, is that liabil ity insurance law is no more distinct from
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tort law than "law" is distinct from "practice," and that thi s application of
insurance law ' s equal consideration principle is only one o f many legal
phenomena that demonstrate that tort law-in-action is not

grounded

primarily in deterrence.
Indeed, working through the liability insurance tetrahedron provides
further evidence that victim compensation is at least as important to tort
law-in-action as deterrance.

In each of the pattern cases that presented a

real "plaintiff s choice" (which is to say, all but the Misrepresentation
C ase), that choice turned in part on the ability-to-pay of the insured. When

the insured has no assets, the liability insurance relationship presents the
plainti ff with the opportunity to ally tacitly with the insured against the
company and, in e ffect, to expand the insurance available for the c laim.
But, where the insured has assets, the liability insurance relationship
presents the plaintiff with the opportunity to ally tacitly with the company
against the insured and, in effect, to narrow the insurance available for the
c laim.
Thus,

in part

because

of liability

insurance,

tort

law-in-action

constitutes a sliding scale system of deterrence at least partially attuned to
the defendant ' s ability to pay. The greater the wealth of the defendant, the

more tort law-in-action serves a deterrence function.

The less the wealth

o f the defendant, the more deterrence gives way to compensation .

I am

reserving my normative judgment about that for a better understanding of
the world than that provided by current tort and insurance theory.
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APPENDIX
CONSTRUCTING THE INSURANCE
LIABILITY TETRAHEDRON

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

\

Copy and enlarge the insurance liability tetrahedron below.
Fold dotted lines and Flaps A. B & C down.
Tape Flap A under the
Tape Flap B
Tape Flap C

Settlement Triangle.
under the Jwy Triangle.
under Plaintiff's Choice Triangle.
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